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Abstract
Internet of things (IoT) is currently on our doorsteps. Numerous do-
mains have benefited from this technology. It ranges from a simple
application such as identifying an object up to handling a more com-
plex system. The Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) is one of the
enabling technologies that drive the IoT to its position today. It is
small, cheap and does not require any additional power sources. Along
with its ubiquitous functionality, this technology enables the position-
ing of an object within a specific area. Ambient Assisted Living (AAL)
is one of the many domains that benefit from the IoT. It aims at as-
sisting elderly people in their daily routines by providing new assistive
services in smart homes for instance. RFIDs in a smart home come as a
great help to an elderly person, for example, to find an object that they
misplaced. However, even with all its benefits in simplifying our lives,
it is unfortunately double-edged where the advantage that it brings to
an object could in turn go against itself. Indeed to be able to help the
older adults to locate an object, the system requires certain data in
relation to the positioning of the object and its identification. As the
passive RFID tag coverage is very small, once its presence is detected,
it is difficult to hide it. The ability of this technology in localizing
objects gives an opportunity to a third person to take an advantage of
the system.
In parallel with the persistent and constant need of privacy and se-
crecy by the users, the objective of this thesis consists of improving
the privacy in localizing an object through a new protocol based on
the latest version of the RFID second generation passive tag. The pro-
posed protocol must be able to prevent an object from being identified
and located by unauthorized parties or a malicious reader. The first
contribution of this work is the assessment of the RFID anti collision
management. It is performed through the creation of an OMNET++
framework, modelled and built based on the latest RFID standard de-
veloped by GS1 and incorporated by ISO/IEC called Gen2V2 (RFID
class 2 Generation 2 Version 2). It is a passive RFID tag that does not
require any internal power sources to operate. It communicates using
the UHF frequency. The Gen2V2 standard provides a list of crypto-
graphical suites that can be used as a method to authenticate a tag
and a reader. This new generation of tags is supported by an alliance
of manufacturers called RAIN (RAdio frequency IdentificatioN) that
promotes the adoption of the Gen2V2. The anti collision management
overall performance is then compared with its theoretical value and four
of its cryptographical suites namely PRESENT80, XOR, AES128 and
cryptoGPS. Among the performances evaluated within the framework
is the number of collisions and the duration required to interrogate a
group of tags. Note that an addition of a localization functionality
within the framework reveals that exchanged messages through wire-
less channel prior to the authentication can lead to a malicious local-
ization of an object. To increase the localization privacy within AAL
application, we propose therefore a second contribution which is a new
localization method that is based on the current Gen2V2 standard ex-
changes by anonymizing the tag identity.
Résumé
Internet des objets (IoT) est actuellement à notre portée. De nombreux
domaines ont bénéficié de cette technologie. Cela va d’une applica-
tion simple, comme l’identification d’un objet jusqu’à la gestion d’un
système plus complexe. L’identification par radiofréquence (RFID)
est l’une des technologies qui a une part importante dans l’IoT au-
jourd’hui. C’est une technologie embarquée, peu onéreuse et qui ne
nécessite aucune source d’alimentation supplémentaire dans le cas de
tag passif. Avec sa fonctionnalité omniprésente, cette technologie per-
met d’identifier un objet dans une zone spécifique. L’Assistance et
l’Autonomie des personnes à Domicile (AAL) est l’un des nombreux
domaines qui bénéficient de l’IoT. Il vise à aider les personnes âgées
dans leurs routines quotidiennes en fournissant de nouveaux services
d’assistance dans les maisons intelligentes (smart home). La présence
de RFID dans une maison intelligente est d’une grande aide pour une
personne âgée et/ou déficiente, par exemple, pour l’aider à trouver un
objet dans son environnement quotidien.
Cependant, parmi tous les avantages qu’apporte l’IoT dans notre vie
quotidienne certains peuvent s’avérer de réels inconvénients en partic-
ulier la localisation et le respect de la vie privée. En effet, pour pouvoir
aider les personnes âgées à localiser un objet, le système nécessite cer-
taines données relatives au positionnement de cet objet, tout au moins
son identification. Étant donné que la couverture de l’étiquette RFID
passive est très faible, une fois sa présence détectée, il est difficile de la
masquer. La capacité de cette technologie à localiser des objets donne
l’occasion à une tierce personne de profiter du système.
Parallèlement au besoin persistant et constant de confidentialité par
les utilisateurs, l’objectif de cette thèse consiste à améliorer la confi-
dentialité dans la localisation d’un objet grâce à un nouveau protocole
basé sur la deuxième génération de RFID passive. Le protocole pro-
posé doit pouvoir empêcher un objet d’être identifié et localisé par
des parties non autorisées ou par un lecteur malveillant. La première
contribution de ce travail est l’évaluation de la gestion anti-collision
RFID. Elle est réalisée par la création d’un modèle OMNET++, con-
struit sur la base de la dernière norme RFID développée par GS1 et
adaptée par ISO / IEC appelé Gen2V2 (RFID classe 2 Génération 2
Version 2). Les étiquettes (tag) RFID passives conforment à Gen2V2
communiquent dans la bande de fréquence UHF (900MHZ) avec des
portées de plusieurs dizaines de mètres. La norme Gen2V2 propose
une liste de suites cryptographiques qui peuvent être utilisées comme
méthodes pour authentifier une étiquette et un lecteur. Cette nouvelle
génération d’étiquettes est soutenue par une alliance de fabricants ap-
pelée RAIN (RAdio frequency IdentifatioN) qui favorise l’adoption du
Gen2V2. Nous évaluons dans cette thèse les performances globales du
protocole anti-collision et nous comparons ensuite quatre de ces suites
cryptographiques, à savoir PRESENT80, XOR, AES128 et cryptoGPS
pour garantir l’authentification lecteur/tag. Parmi les performances
évaluées dans ce modèle, nous nous sommes intéressé au nombre de
collisions et à la durée requise pour interroger un groupe d’étiquettes.
Nous avons intégré la fonctionnalité de localisation dans le modèle en
s’appuyant sur les messages échangés avant l’authentification, ce qui
peut conduire à une localisation malveillante d’un objet. Pour aug-
menter la confidentialité de la localisation au sein des applications
AAL, nous proposons donc une deuxième contribution qui est une nou-
velle méthode de localisation basée sur les échanges standard Gen2V2
en anonymisant l’identité de l’étiquette.
Contents
iii
v
vii
xi
xiii
xv
Abstract 
Résumé 
Contents
List of Figures 
List of Tables 
Acronyms
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) at a glance . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2.1 Research focus in IoT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.1.1 Logistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.1.2 Retail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.1.3 SmartHome . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.1.4 Healthcare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.2 Application of the IoT to improve the Quality of Life . . . . 7
1.3 Simulation Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.4 Thesis Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2 State of the Art 9
2.1 General overview of Internet of Things (IoT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
vii
CONTENTS
2.2 Ambient Assisted Living (AAL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2.1 AAL Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2.2 AAL Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3 Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3.1 Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) air interface standards 15
2.3.1.1 Below 135kHz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3.1.2 NFC 13.56MHz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3.1.3 RFID 860MHz to 960MHz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3.1.4 RFID 2.45GHz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3.2 RFID Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3.2.1 Active tags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3.2.2 Semi active tags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3.2.3 Passive tag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3.3 RFID standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.3.3.1 RFID Generation 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.3.3.2 RFID Class 1 Generation 2 Version 1 (C1G2) . . . 20 
2.3.3.3 RFID Class 1 Generation 2 Version 2 (Gen2V2) . . 21
2.3.4 RAIN RFID tag collision management . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3.4.1 Frame Slotted Aloha efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.3.4.2 Collision Management Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3.5 RFID Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.4 Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.4.1 Passive Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.4.1.1 Eavesdropping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.4.1.2 Relay attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.4.2 Active Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.4.2.1 Desynchronization attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.4.2.2 Man in the middle attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.4.3 Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.4.4 Advanced Encryption Standard: AES128 . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.4.5 PRESENT-80 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.4.6 XOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.4.7 cryptoGPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
viii
CONTENTS
2.5 2D Tag Localization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.5.1 Trilateration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.5.1.1 Roundtrip Time of Flight (RToF) . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.5.1.2 Angle of arrival (AoA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.5.1.3 Received Signal Strength (RSS) . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.5.1.4 Phase of Arrival (PoA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.5.2 Trilateration calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.6 Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.6.1 Localization Privacy with RFID tags . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.6.2 Privacy Threat in RFID localization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.6.3 RFID Privacy Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3 Gen2V2 Framework in OMNET++ 63
3.1 OMNET++ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.2 OMNET++ structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.2.1 Network definition files (NED) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.2.2 Simple module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.2.3 Compound module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.2.4 Communication channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.2.5 OMNET++ coding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.2.6 OMNET++ troubleshooting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.3 Gen2V2 framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.3.1 Gen2V2 hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.3.1.1 Module: ModuleTag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.3.1.2 Submodule: authenticationTag . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.3.1.3 Submodule: Radio Medium . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.3.1.4 Module: adversary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.4 Anti-collision management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.5 Cryptographic Suites within the framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.6 Cryptographical suites evaluation results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.6.1 Evaluation parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.6.2 Framework execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
ix
CONTENTS
3.6.3 Simulation results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.7 RFID localization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.7.1 Module: Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.7.2 Submodule: localization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.7.2.1 Scenario 1: Wait for all tags . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.7.2.2 Scenario 2: Tag by tag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.7.2.3 Scenario 3: Realtime update . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.7.2.4 Localization results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.8 RFID tag privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.9 Localization privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.10 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4 Conclusion and Perspectives 95
4.1 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.2 Prespectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.2.1 Short term perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.2.2 Long term perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
99
105
Appendix 
Publications 
Bibliography 107
x
List of Figures
2.1 The Internet of Things . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 Example of tags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3 Ambient Assisted Living . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.4 RFID frequency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.5 RFID type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.6 RFID classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.7 Gen2V2 communication exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.8 ALOHA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.9 Slotted Aloha Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.10 Gen2V2 Collision Management Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.11 RFID security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.12 Eavesdropping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.13 Relay Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.14 Man-in-the-Middle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.15 RFID security classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.16 Gen2V2 Improvement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.17 AES128 chart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.18 AES128: Authentication protocol exchange between reader and tag 37
2.19 PRESENT-80: Protocol exchange between reader and tag . . . . . 40
2.20 PRESENT80 chart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.21 XOR: Protocol exchange between reader and tag . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.22 XOR chart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.23 CryptoGPS chart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.24 cryptoGPS: Protocol exchange between reader and tag . . . . . . . 48
xi
LIST OF FIGURES
2.25 Roundtrip Time of Flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.26 AoA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.27 Trilateration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.28 Localization Privacy Topology 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.1 OMNET++ network definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.2 OMNET++ simple module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.3 OMNET++ compound module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.4 OMNET++: Event Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.5 Scenario 1: QueryAdjust at the end of the frame . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.6 Scenario2: QueryAdjust right after collision . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.7 ModuleTag Topology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.8 NodeTag Topology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.9 Collisios vs Q values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.10 Total duration vs Q values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.11 Reader’s collision management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.12 Slotted Aloha Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.13 Efficiency comparison with 100 tags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.14 Authentication duration fo 20 tags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.15 Authentication duration for 100 tags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.16 Localization Topology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.17 Scenario summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.18 Scenario 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.19 Scenario 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.20 Scenario 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.21 Scenario 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.22 Localization duration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.23 Gen2V2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.24 Localization Privacy Topology 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
xii
List of Tables
2.1 Tag classification vs resource . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2 Q vs total slot number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.3 Efficiency values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.4 AES128 request format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.5 AES: Substitution Box . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.6 AES: Shifting columns to the left . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.7 AES: MixColumns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.8 PRESENT-80 Substitution box . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.9 PRESENT-80 permutation box . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.1 AES128 request format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.2 Tag distance from readers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
xiii

Acronyms
AAL Ambient Assisted Living
ACK ACKnowledgement
ADL Activities of Daily Living
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AoA Angle of Arrival
CSI Cryptographic Suite Indicator
ECDLP Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem
EPC Electronic Product Code
FSA Framed Slotted ALOHA
GE Gate Equivalent
IoT Internet of Things
ISO International Standards Organization
NED NEtwork Description
NFC Near-Field Communication
PoA Phase of Arrival
PRNG PseudoRandom Number Generator
RAIN RAdio frequency IdentificatioN
RFID Radio Frequency IDentification
RN16 16 bits Random Number
RSSI Received Signal Strength Indicator
RTLS Real Time Location Services
xv
ACRONYMS
RToF RoundTrip of Flight
ToA Time of Arrival
ToF Time of Flight
UHF Ultra High Frequency
xvi
1 Introduction
The invention of the computer and the introduction of the Internet result in
almost everything to be connected together. The idea of connecting objects is
developing at an incredible speed and now covers an unbelievable number of ar-
eas. The Internet of Things (IoT) has driven numerous improvements in various
domains. Thanks to the Internet of Things, every object that is connected to a
network could now be tagged with an identification and is able to answer to various
conditions in a smart way.
Historically, it started in the logistic area where the primary objective was
to tag and/or to record an object for inventory purpose and to manage various
stocks and movement of both raw materials and final products. However, it was
not an intelligent system as the function was only limited to keeping track of the
amount of things in stock. As more and more specialised inputs such as sensors
are included in the system, it began to open up to various other possibilities.
Smart Environment is the fruit of ideas on a controlled environment where
every object is connected to other objects and is able to go from performing a
simple and specific task to providing more complex services. As an example, the
ubiquitous system could perform tasks such as maintaining the humidity level of
an area with humidifier/dehumidifier sensors, maintaining the optimum temper-
ature with the air conditioning sensors, or maintaining optimum light intensity
level with light related sensors. Smart Home is one of the derivative results of
the Smart Environment where several features such as light and temperature are
automatically regulated based on the owners’ preferences.
Through the use of IoT, every connected object could be tagged with an iden-
tification and an answer to various conditions in a smart way. Many objects are
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embedded with RFID tags such as clothings and books. Tags are specifically at-
tached or sewn into the items to indicate the price or to act as an anti-theft system.
Now with the invention of nanotechnology, it is possible to incorporate nano-tags
directly in the constituting material of the objects. As IoT relates to almost every-
thing, one needs to consider the essential requirements that fit in every scenarios.
As today’s population age keeps increasing, we can see more and more elderly
people trying to live independently in their own house. However, with age, staying
safe and independent is a major challenge. Ambient Assisted Living (AAL) has
among its principal aims to help these people to achieve this goal and IoT can be
an interesting solution to achieve that. Localization is needed to support AAL , for
example, to locate the person at a specific moment. This is to help in monitoring
their behavior during the day and at night so that the system can learn what are
the person’s behaviors that are considered normal and decide either if the person
requires any help or if and when he is not behaving ’normally’. This function is
useful in order to optimize the number of contact hours required by a helper to
spend with a person. Thus at the same time to maximize the number of person
that the helper can handle. Another possible reason is to help an elderly person to
locate their belongings within the house. Each object can be tagged and identified
to make their life easier. However, this does not come without any inconvenience.
Indeed, if the elderly person can easily locate and identify their belongings, any
other person that has the same arrangements can also perform the same opera-
tion. This will make their belongings and all related information to be exposed
to everybody. And this is one of the numerous reasons AAL application is not
accepted nor adopted in the market. In order to improve the acceptance of the
system, the overall security and privacy of the system need to be enhanced.
1.1 Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) at a
glance
The idea of having the ability to manage an object from afar, either to gather
information or to have full control of it has always inspired everybody. A simple
example is the invention of the television remote control which facilitates the con-
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trol of the television channels but does not require the user to be in the proximity
to the television set.
Research on the identification of objects is not new. It has been going on for
over ten years. It started with inventorying system, initially to replace the barcode
system that requires physical access to the object as in a supermarket where the
cashier system identifies the object one by one with the help of a hand held reader.
It is based on a laser technology that requires a clear vision from the reader to the
tag. It could be time consuming to identify each items.
Ever since its inception, RFID tag has been introduced and used in a numerous
domains. For example, a tag serves as an identification tool for animals as defined
in ISO standards [1, 2, 3] and/or any objects in general. A tag can also act
as a method to authenticate the owner of an object in an access control system
such as in a car immobiliser or parking/building entrance by using a MIFARE
or NFC (Near Field Communication) card as a method of authentication (refer
to ISO14443 [4]). Again, a tag can be used as a payment method due to the
ability to authenticate the user. This feature is fundamental in order to guarantee
secured transactions. Various industries have tried to propose their solutions in
this matter, such as Apple Pay [5], Android Pay [6], Samsung Pay [7], Orange
Cash [8]. Only time would tell the winner of this race.
The introduction of a Radio Frequency IDentifier helps to improve the pro-
ductivity. It requires the item to be within the readers’ communication range.
Therefore no object handling is needed. This helps in reducing the amount of
time needed to identify a group of items. On top of that, all items are uniquely
identified. A few years later, the improving technology permits the use of wireless
technology within the identification process. With this new technology, the devel-
opment shifted from an object that could only identify itself, towards an object
that could react based on a request. However, this enables everybody to hear the
conversation done between the object and the reader. This creates a security issue
to the system. Current researches are heading towards the security and privacy of
the system. Many tries to handle the authentication of different component within
the system and tries to identify how secure it is. Some researches focuses on the
information exchanged. Could anybody intercept the data? What kind of data
could be released? Could someone hijack the object? All of these issues will be
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addressed in the following sections.
1.2 Motivation
The fear of not being able to ensure security and privacy of the connected
object is slowing the adoption rate of the IoT in sensitive domains such as AAL.
Earlier deployment does not consider the security and privacy parameters as a
major issue. But, the risk exists due to the fact that the data exchange is going
through a wireless communication channel. As a result, anybody could easily
intercept the transmitted information.
On a positive side, a connected object offers endless possibilities to improve our
day to day tasks in controlling machines, access and stocks. One could imagine
that one day people could have their shopping list updated automatically as the
stock in the refrigerator or the pantry reduces, their electrical appliances to switch
on automatically during the lowest rate or to set their preferred environment before
arriving home such as the air conditioning, lights, etc. and to set the microwave
to reheat their food to be ready to be served.
With regards to senior persons’ lives, they tend to be forgetful as they age and
often misplaces their belongings. The current technology in the Internet of Things
(IoT) can assist them in solving this issue. IoT covers various domain, including
inventory. The inventory system is known for managing stocks. In the past, it
served in monitoring stocks in a warehouse. Nowadays it can be applied to other
groups of items such as groceries, medical supplies, etc. For an elder, the use of
inventory in his daily living could prevent any shortage of things he owns or needs
such as his medicine, for example, during the holiday period, where all pharmacies
are closed. Tagging each of their belongings with an electronic tag does not only
help in managing their inventory, but it can also assist them in recording the
location of each item. It can be done systematically or based on ad hoc requests.
In order to reduce the burden on the system, it should have at least the last
known position of the previous request. However, the frequency of the localisation
process should be refined from one user to another. If the object is within a house
and is not a mobile object, the detection could be done based on an ad hoc request.
Otherwise, the detection could be configured once in every few seconds or minutes.
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Theoretically, this can be done by sending a timely beacon signal.
The ability to position a tag is based on the detection of communication signal
between the object and its sensor. The drawback of this method is that it is
not only visible to the dedicated sensors, but it is also visible to all the other
sensors within the range. Therefore, if there is no effort made to hide the position
of the object, it is therefore virtually known to everybody. Hence, this could
compromise the individual’s privacy. This personal privacy includes information
on their health condition, where a list of medications could reveal that they are
currently being treated for a particular ailment. As a result, this could put the
person in a disadvantaged situation or worse, he could be stigmatised because of
his illness.
As the location of every object to the person could be known to everybody, for
a burglar, it is like being able to pick a house to be burgled from a promotional
brochure, where every item is listed in detail. It will be worse for the house owner
if the burglar could even detect the location of the house’s security alarm. The fact
that whatever items in the house are easily located brings another issue, where
within a limited time the burglar could identify the most expensive items.
1.2.1 Research focus in IoT
As the time progresses, the IoT research diversifies towards the development
of services that could be beneficial to humankind. Our research focuses on do-
mains that use the RFID technology. Therefore, we are interested in the evolu-
tion trend of the connected object in particular in areas such as leisure, logistics,
transportation, retail, smart infrastructure, aeronautical industry, healthcare and
environment.
1.2.1.1 Logistics
IoT derives a lot from the logistics domain. It helps to identify a particular
object from a huge number of other objects. It is a very good example of RFID
applications scenario in IoT. Its ability improves the inventory system by quickly
determining if the raw material is about to be ordered and re-adjust the reorder
level based on the availability of every component. It also reduces the burden of
5
1. INTRODUCTION
stock tracking, inventorying and after sales services. Among research in focusing
in improving the inventory accuracy is done by Helstrom et al. in [9] and Fan et
al. in [10].
1.2.1.2 Retail
In retail sevices, RFID tags are used as an anti theft device. It prevents the
merchandise from being stolen from the store. An unpaid item taken out from the
store will trigger the alarm. As for the luxury items, the RFID tags are also used
to prove the genuineness of the item. A counterfeiter can reproduce the object as
similar as possible to the original one but can never duplicate the authenticity tag
that is normally embedded within the item. The decision either to integate the
RFID tag on the object is also discussed by Piramuthu et al. in [11].
1.2.1.3 SmartHome
To be fully functional, a SmartHome relies on the support of different technolo-
gies. The RFID offers the functionality such as the door access control with the
help of a smart card, various services involving garments such as cloth sorting by
color, material, events, etc. The unique identification of the garment can also help
to identify the optimum conditions in washing machine, in the dryer and during
the ironing process. In the kitchen, the refrigerator can communicate the quantity
of a tagged item. During a shopping trip, the owner can interogate the refrigerator
about the existing stock and determine what needs to be bought.
1.2.1.4 Healthcare
Healthcare is one of the domains that benefits the most from the recent im-
provement in IoT. It enables the monitoring of the patient to be more accurate.
The monitoring can be performed continously by using a wearable RFID that can
incessantly feed the system with specific readings such as the glucose level as pro-
posed by Cho et al. in [12]. With the bodycentric RFID tag, the patient movement
in the ward can also be monitored. The system can monitor all their gestures and
behaviors in order to help to identify the possible symptoms. The system can also
detect if the patient is passively lying on the bed or lying motionlessly in the toilet.
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This scenario is possible with the help of the bodycentric RFID system similar to
the one mentioned by Manzari et al. in [13]. The system can also suggest to the
doctor possible illness based on the patient’s symptoms. It can provide the correct
medication and its optimum dosage as discussed by Jara et al. in [14]. The use of
RFID can reduce the human error of misinterpreting the doctor’s or the pharma-
cist’s handwriting. Having a unique indentification also helps in keeping track of
the patient’s medical record.
1.2.2 Application of the IoT to improve the Quality of Life
In IoT, an object is assumed to be able to identify itself. Each object has
a unique identity. It is also considered to be able to collect information of its
surrounding, such as temperature, humidity, etc. It should be able to communicate
with others through a wireless connection. It should be able to make a decision
based on a given situation and based on the data gathered, it should be able to
react accordingly.
IoT covers multiple domains. In the smaller scale, it includes assisting a senior
person on a day to day chores in a smart environment for example by switching
on and off the lights, heater, etc. The IoT can help a senior to stay in his resident
without going to a retirement home.
DOMUS (DOMotics at the Université de Sherbrooke) is one of many labora-
tories that focuses in helping people with cognitive disorders either through AAL
or Smart Home. As an example, to assist an elderly with Alzheimer Desease, the
"Nighttime Assistance System" is proposed by Radziszewski et al. in [15, 16] in
order to help calm the person and incite him to go to sleep thus minimizing night-
time wanderings. Along with that, Bergeron et al. in [17] concentrated on the
positioning of an indoor object in Smart Home environment in order to enable the
object tracking in the future.
In healthcare, the introduction of IoT technology helps in reducing human
error in either the prescription or administration of drugs. In a bigger scale,
IoT supports the industrial automation with millions of tags in managing raw
materials, production, stocks and after sales services [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23].
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1.3 Simulation Model
The work for this thesis concentrates on the improvement of RFID localization
privacy. In order to do so, it requires a working RFID framework. Due to the lack
of availability of the framework, the development of a framework in OMNET++
based on the current standard is then proposed. All RFID principal aspects such
as the shared medium, anti collision management, security and authentication are
included in the implementation.
1.4 Thesis Outline
This manuscript is organised by as follows:
Chapter 2 introduces the IoT concept, AAL definitions and challenges, RFID
standards and related issues in security, localization, privacy and localization pri-
vacy. This chapter also covers four out of nine cryptographical suites that is
available to be used with the current standard.
Chapter 3 focuses on the newly modeled Gen2V2 framework within OM-
NET++ simulator based on the current standard, the implementation of tag
anti-collision management, several cryptographical suites, tag localization and tag
localization privacy. It also covers all results related to the investigation published
in [24] along with localization and localization privacy results.
Chapter 4 concludes the work and discusses the short term and the long term
perspectives
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This chapter presents a general review of the Internet of Things within the
Ambient Assisted Living. A discussion on the Radio Frequency Identification
(RFID) as the enabling technology and the possibility of maintaining secrecy, in
particular regarding the localization of the connected things are presented.
2.1 General overview of Internet of Things (IoT)
Figure 2.1 – Internet of Things
More and more connected objects are present in our daily activities thanks to
the Internet of Things (IoT). These connected objects improve the productivity
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of various tasks by providing their applications with relevant realtime data as
depicted in Figure 2.1 such as the current quantity, current temperature, current
humidity, current luminosity and security level that could be applied in various
domains.
In order to provide better and broader services to the connected object in var-
ious domains, different communication technologies such as the RFID [25], Near
Field Communication (NFC) [26], WiFi [27], ANT+ [28], Bluetooth [29], Zigbee
(based on Personal Area Network (PAN) [30]) and Zwave [31] are used. Each
connected object is uniquely identified so that the system is able to address the
object when it is necessary. All the technologies stated above provide this func-
tionality, including the RFID. NFC offers wireless data transfer in close proximity
without requiring any pairing code. As an example of current applications, more
and more credit cards, smartphones and smartwatches are embedded with NFC in
order to encourage the use of electronic money. WiFi is one of the most popular,
if not the most popular, wireless technology used nowadays. It is compatible to a
broad range of devices such as computers, laptops, printers, televisions, game con-
soles, smartphones, etc. ANT+, Bluetooth, Zigbee and ZWave share the market
in allowing simple connections between small devices through wireless connection
without the need of having extended configuration. An advantage of ANT+ over
Bluetooth is that it consumes less. Zigbee however, enables connection of more
than 65000 nodes but with less transfer speed. Being the small brother of WiFi,
Zigbee is able to support mesh network architecture in communication that en-
able all devices to be connected directly. ZWave concentrates on devices serves for
home automation such as light bulbs, electric heater, etc.
A large number of academic papers cover the IoT phenomenon [18, 19, 20,
21, 22, 23]. The IoT includes vast domains such as logistics, access control, smart
environment, medicine and healthcare. Each research brings a new insight from its
own point of view. Its different aspects will be discussed further in the following
sections.
Based on all the survey papers cited above, the IoT technology can be sum-
marised as consisting of three main components;
• Unique identification
Sensors and tags are samples of input devices. Sensors are usually designed
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Figure 2.2 – Example of tags
to measure the changes in the environment (light, temperature, humidity,
position, audio, video, voltage, current, etc.). Tags are intended to com-
municate an identity. They are predominantly passive (without embedded
energy) and use contactless technologies such as Radio Frequency Identifi-
cation (RFID) and Near Field Communication (NFC). Some tag examples
are represented in Figure 2.2.
• Communication channel
A communication channel mainly uses the radio medium such as Bluetooth,
Zigbee and WiFi. Its objective is to enable the exchange of information with
its environment. It transmits data to the global information system, which
consists of local software applications for the data acquisition, data process-
ing and data storage. This data can be distributed locally or centralized in
the cloud environment.
• Information system
The information system is the core of the overall system that provides
services to the users. It manages the data collection by storing, modifying
and removing data from the system. It controls the behavior of the system
based on the feedback given by the input devices. As an example, to prevent
any material shortage, a stock monitoring system can identify the quantity
of a raw material and is able to schedule a new stock request while at the
same time taking into consideration the time delivery before passing the
order.
Having seen the existing main technologies in IoT, the next section will present
the AAL environment in IoT.
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2.2 Ambient Assisted Living (AAL)
As today’s population age keeps increasing, older adults try to stay at home as
long as possible. However, at a certain age, remaining safe while being independent
is a major challenge. Ambient Assisted Living helps these people to achieve this
goal.
Figure 2.3 briefly represents AAL in 4 groups of activities.
Ambient 
Assisted 
Living
eHealth eMedicine
Smart Environment
Activity of Daily Living
Internet of Things
Figure 2.3 – Ambient Assisted Living within the IoT
• The objective of the smart environment is to manage the home access and
comfortable ambience so that the elderly can feel safe and secure.
• The e-Medicine monitors the medication history. It records the patient’s
current status, the progress, the side effect encountered, the type of med-
ications given, etc. It also serves as a reminder for the elderly person to
take their medication, with a correct dosage and to report to their helper
or the person in charge in their family or their pharmacist if the medication
is about to finish.
• The Activity of Daily Living (ADL) describes their daily routine, such as
cleaning, cooking, to move from one room to another, etc.
• e-Health helps in monitoring their health condition. It also helps to alert
the relevant parties if the person requires a medical attention.
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2.2.1 AAL Challenge
The primary challenge in AAL is the senior person’s safety. The system is
capable of monitoring their every action. If they are not performing their daily
routines as usual or if their health deteriorates, multiple sensors will trigger a
preventive action and notify the person in charge. This action shall minimise the
risk of any possible dangerous situation such as a heart attack, an accidental fall,
etc.
However, if anything happens without warning, the system shall detect the
unfortunate event and notify the emergency status to the relevant parties. The
relevant parties can be the family doctor, the ambulance services, and/or the
relatives.
Another significant challenge is how to protect personal data. All these activi-
ties require continuous data collection. As every data of the senior person is vital,
the system collects among others:
• Health related information
◦ heartbeats
◦ blood pressure
◦ oxygen level
◦ body temperature
• Medical information
◦ drug prescriptions - drugs details, frequency of administration, amoun-
t/dosage.
• Personal environment preference
◦ room temperature
◦ room brightness
◦ room humidity
• Object information
◦ identification
◦ current position
However, with the amount of data collected, it can be used against them. The
medical information can reveal the person’s illness. It can also be used as a leverage
to get the upper hand in any negotiations. Section 2.6 will elaborate and discuss
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this matter in detail.
Once the security and the protection of the personal data are assured, the
implementation of the AAL shall see a bright future. The ability to help the
elderly person to perform their daily activities are endless. Various researches
have been done to help the senior persons’ daily chores such as to cook, to go to
the toilet, or to move from one room to another.
2.2.2 AAL Technology
Thanks to the technologies such as RFID, NFC, WiFi, ANT+, Bluetooth,
Zigbee and Zwave (refer to IoT overview in section 2.1), AAL is able to help a
senior person in their day to day routine. The smart environment uses sensors and
switches to control the environment (detect, switch on, switch off). Other activities
maximise the employment of passive RFID to reduce the cost of implementation.
In this work, we will concentrate on the RFID technology as the enabler of the
AAL. The following chapter will present the RFID’s general specifications followed
by the RFID localization possibilities and how to ensure its security and privacy.
2.3 Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) drives most of the AAL solutions. It
is made up of a system, a reader and a tag. The system stores and manages the
information, the reader acts as the entry point to the system and the tag serves as
an electronic identification agent attached to the object. Wyld in his book entitled
"The Right Frequency for Government"(2005) [32] defined RFID as the technology
that enables the identification of objects automatically by gathering data on these
objects without any human intervention or data entry. The author also asserted
that the RFID is not a new technology as it is actually a subset of the existing
Radio Frequency technology that has been around since the 19th century and the
idea came from an experiment dated back in 1886 by Frederick Hertz. The first
known application of the RFID is the IFF (Identify Friend or Foe) during the World
War II to identify an enemy aircraft. And since then, the RFID took a slow pace
in being ready to be integrated in different domain. Among earlier applications
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are in the domain of asset management, livestock tracking and transportation.
Nowadays, almost every domain is touched by the RFID. However, for the past
ten years the awareness about the RFID security has finally emerged.
Aligned with the same idea, according to CNRFID [33], RFID is defined as an
automatic identification technology which uses radio-frequency electromagnetic
fields in order to identify any objects that carry a tag whenever they get close
to a reader. This identification includes the collection of the data contained in
the tag by the reader. With the ability to read and collect the data from the
tag, the reader also has the possibility to alter these data from the tag’s memory.
Currently the RFID standards are characterized by GS1 [34] and ISO standard
organisations [35].
2.3.1 Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) air interface
standards
Passive RFID tags have a limited communication range as described in ISO/IEC
18000 series of standard [36, 37, 38, 39, 40] and simplified in Figure 2.4. A passive
RFID is capable of communicating within four frequencies :
2.3.1.1 Below 135kHz
Also known as Low Frequency (LF), this frequency standard is defined in ISO
11784 [1], ISO 11785 [2] and ISO/IEC 18000-2 [37]. The communication range is
limited up to 0.1 meter. The main objective of this frequency is to ensure that a
tag is in the vicinity of the reader. The tag is only capable of transmitting a small
amount of data and the transmission rate is as low as 1 kbps. Typical application
of this type of tag can be seen in the automotive industry, in the vehicle access
control system or it is used as an animal identification tag. Its size is as small as
a grain of rice.
2.3.1.2 NFC 13.56MHz
The second frequency range is at 13.56MHz ( also called the High Frequency
(HF)). The standard that is applied to this frequency range is the ISO/IEC 18000-
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3 [38]. Among other types of technologies using the same frequency is the passive
RFID [41], the proximity card as defined in ISO14443-2 [4], and the vicinity card
as stated in ISO15693-2 [42]. The signal can go up to 0.1 meter. It has a higher
data rate than the previous one (referring to [43], ISO 14443A has a maximum
data rate of 106kbps, ISO 14443B has a maximum data rate of 847kbps and ISO
15693 has a maximum data rate of 26.4kbps). These types of cards are used mostly
as library books identification system and as smart cards. They are commercially
known as MIFARE and NFC.
2.3.1.3 RFID 860MHz to 960MHz
The third frequency range is between 860MHz to 960MHz (also called the
Ultra-High Frequency(UHF)) as established in ISO/IEC 18000-6 [39]. It is the
most commonly used tag frequency. It does not require a line of sight and can
transmit high data rate (as mention in the standard [39], it has a maximum data
rate of 40kbps). It can reach up to ten meters and is normally used in supply
chains to track the stock flow. Since October 2013, GS1 (Global Standards) has
ratified EPC Gen2v2, a new version of the widely used Gen2 Ultra High Frequency
(UHF) RFID standard. Gen2v2 is backwards compatible with Gen2 but adds new
features mainly for authenticating tags and readers as well as consumer privacy.
These new features ease the adoption of RFID especially in application areas where
the tag carries more information than only its identity. UHF is now an established
technology, solutions can be reliably deployed for long read range, passive, and
cheap. This new generation of tags is supported by an alliance of manufacturers
called RAIN (RAdio-frequency IdentificatioN) [44]. The RAIN RFID Alliance is
a non-profit organization that promotes awareness, education, and initiatives to
accelerate the adoption of passive UHF RFID standards developed by GS1 (EPC
Gen2) and incorporated by ISO/IEC (18000-63) [45] in business and consumer
applications worldwide.
2.3.1.4 RFID 2.45GHz
Finally, the ISO/IEC 18000-4 [40] specifies the standard of the Super High
Frequency(SHF) that operates at 2.45GHz which enables the communication range
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of more than 10 meters. This tag focuses more on getting a bigger communication
range and a bigger data rate but is more sensitive to electronic noise. It is mainly
used in the vehicle fleet identification.
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Figure 2.4 – RFID frequency
RFID classification does not stop at the frequency differences, it goes beyond
that. A specific RFID only applies to a specific application and not to others. The
frequency sharing is due to the availability of the frequency set by the government
in a specific country. The effective classification of a RFID tag is based on its
power sources. The following section discussed the matters elaborately.
2.3.2 RFID Classification
A RFID tag is categorized based on how it is powered, either fully powered,
partially powered or without any internal power as illustrated in Figure 2.5. Fur-
thermore the EPCglobal standard [46], the power-related RFID classification can
be further extended into four functional classes that are based on the features
supported by the tag. Figure 2.6 depicts the RFID categorization in detail where
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it can be seen that there are three different kinds of tags: active, semi active and
passive tags.
Figure 2.5 – RFID tag
Figure 2.6 – GS1 RFID classification
2.3.2.1 Active tags
An active RFID tag includes an internal source of energy such as a battery
to ensure that both the internal circuitry and the transmitter are available at all
time. The class 4 tag represents the active tags that can initiate communications
with readers or other tags without the need to wait to be energized by any signal.
2.3.2.2 Semi active tags
The semi active/semi passive tag collects energy from the reader to commu-
nicate. However, it depends on the internal power source to keep the internal
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circuitry active. The class 3 tag represents the semi active tag. It is equipped
with an identification, an internal memory for information storage and an authen-
tication mechanism. It is also capable of controlling its confidential information
within a controlled area with the help of the authentication mechanism.
2.3.2.3 Passive tag
A passive tag does not have an internal power source. Hence it collects the
energy from the reader’s request message and replied using the energy gathered
from the signal. Passive tags are currently the most commonly used tags as they
are low in cost and easily available. However, a passive tag can transmit up to ten
meters because of the limited amount of energy collected from the signal that is
sent by the reader.
Class 0, 1 and 2 represent the passive tags with the difference that the class
0 and class 1 are merely an identity tag and no other features are added. The
only difference is that class 0 tags only provide identity as it is preprogrammed
during the fabrication process and cannot be modified. The class 1 tags enable the
user to modify the identification information on the tag once during the set up.
The class 2 tags are equipped with the tag identification with an extended user
memory and an access control authentication mechanism. These tags are capable
of storing additional information rather than only the identity. They also control
the access to a certain section of the memory area where confidential information
can be stored.
class 0 class 1 class 2 class 3 class 4
Active x
Semi active x
Passive x x x
Table 2.1 – Tag classification vs resource
The CNRFID [33] does not differentiate between class 0 and class 1 tags.
Dobkin in his book "The RF in RFID" [43] described further that initially, class
0 and class 1 operate on different protocols and are not compatible between each
other. Furthermore, class 0 requires different frequency to transmit and to receive
signals. Therefore the class 0 has been dropped to make way for the class 1 tags.
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2.3.3 RFID standard
GS1 is a global non-profit organization that develops, creates and manages the
EPC standard through EPCglobal [46]. This standard has been passed over by
the Auto-ID Center that was founded in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT) in 1999. These standard characterizations will be explained further in the
following section.
2.3.3.1 RFID Generation 1
The RFID generation 1 refers to the first standard proposed by Auto-ID Center.
The main objective of this standard is to promote a common path towards a
real standard compared to their predecessors; the barcode and the magnetic strip
card. Through the Electronic Product Code (EPC), each object identification
includes the manufacturer identification, the product category and a serial number.
They also emphasized on the utilization of 900MHz frequency to achieve the best
compromise between their cost, read range and capability.
2.3.3.2 RFID Class 1 Generation 2 Version 1 (C1G2)
In 2004, the Auto-ID Center handed over the EPC standard to the EPCglobal
which then came out with a new standard called the Class 1 Generation 2
(C1G2) and rendered the previous standard on class 0 and class 1 as obsolete.
The standard dropped the class 0 from its specification.
Figure 2.7 described the association phase between a reader and a tag in the
RFID Class 1 Generation 2. To simplify the communication exchanged between
a reader and a tag, no collision has been considered in the best case scenario.
It depicts both the current and the previous protocol communication standard
exchange of the UHF tag. It starts by sending a query request from the reader to
a tag. Considering the best case scenario where only one tag replies at one time,
the tag will send a random number to the reader. Once the reader received the
random number (RN16), the reader duplicates the same random number and sends
it back to the tag. This response is used as the Acknowledge command (ACK)
that indicates the tag that the reader has received the message and they can start
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to communicate. Upon reception of this number, the tag will compare it with its
own record. If numbers are identical, it will then release its identity. The identity
sent is in the form of 96 bits EPC standard that described the manufacturer, the
product category and it’s serial number. The reader will then finish the inventory
session by requesting another random number from the tag to be used for the
following communication exchange.
Figure 2.7 – Best case scenario communication exchange in Gen2V2
2.3.3.3 RFID Class 1 Generation 2 Version 2 (Gen2V2)
The current UHF RFID standard has been published in 2013 and is called the
Generation 2 Version 2 (Gen2V2) [47]. The generation 2 refers to the class 2 tag
that is described in Figure 2.6. It is designed to ensure backward compatibility
with the previous version. The second generation improves the security and pri-
vacy of the tag owner. It limits the access to certain area of the passive tag memory
by adding an authentication process. The UHF RFID tag has since become an
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established technology that can propose reliable solutions for inexpensive and pas-
sive tags which can cater for a long read range. The novelty introduced by the
second generation is presented in red. In all communication exchanges, the reader
starts by selecting a set of tags that will participate in the communication session.
This phase will be followed by an inventory phase where all requests regarding
the identification and authentication are performed. The access to the extended
memory can then be performed after the authentication process is successful. We
can summarize the process in three phases:
• Select: to define the set of tag to be communicated.
• Inventory: the process of interrogating the selected tags.
• Access: the process of accessing tag’s memory.
Figure 2.7 depicts the communication exchanges during the inventory phase.
In this figure, we can see the similarities in the exchange process for the C1G2
tags as described in section 2.3.3.2 and the Gen2V2 tags. However, for Gen2V2,
two additional processes were added which have further enhanced its security and
privacy.
In Gen2V2, the reader will send an authentication request to the tag depending
on the type of authentication selected at the beginning of the session. The tag
prepares the answer and sends it accordingly to the reader. All communications
after this authentication step are considered authenticated. More details about
the procedure will be discussed in section 2.4 and 2.6
This authentication process enforces the next exchanges between the reader and
the tag but does not provide privacy as the EPC is sent without any protection so
that any attacker can know the identity of any tag.
The communication exchange in Figure 2.7 represents the best case scenario
where only one tag communicates at a time (therefore no collision occurs). Unfor-
tunately, it is not always the case. Since the communication medium is based on
wireless technology, it is prone to collisions caused by messages sent simultaneously
by tags or readers. A standard protocol is then required to solve this situation.
The following section will discuss further the method to minimise the collision risk.
22
2.3. RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION (RFID)
2.3.4 RAIN RFID tag collision management
The deployment of hundreds of RFID tags can generate a deadlock communi-
cation situation where two or more tags are responding to an initial request from a
reader simultaneously. As a result, not a single receptor is capable of interpreting
the message accurately due to collisions. Therefore, it requires a particular method
to avoid the collision as proposed by in [48, 49]. Vogt in [48] proposed a method
to detect the RFID tags without knowing its actual numbers. The implementation
however, achieved only 90% accuracy.
Figure 2.8 – Aloha vs Slotted Aloha
RFID tags communicate based on a protocol called the Frame Slotted Aloha
(FSA). The protocol is a derivation of the famous Aloha protocol. In Aloha, a
station can transmit a data as and when needed, therefore, collisions can occur
at any time during a data transmission. It renders the communication channel
to be inefficient. The Slotted Aloha improves collision management by dividing
the transmission into time slots. So, a station can only transmit at the beginning
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of a slot. This will reduce the collision possibility only at the beginning of the
transmission rather than throughout the transmission duration. The Figure 2.8
describes the improvement achieved by using the Slotted Aloha. In both scenario,
TagA sends 2 messages, A1 and A2, TagB and TagC send 1 message each, B1
and C1. Note that in comparison with the traditional Aloha, the Slotted Aloha,
requires the current message to finish transmitting before allowing a new message
to be sent. This, minimize the possibility of having a collision once a tag has
started to transmit its message. The Frame Slotted Aloha also groups the slots in
a frame and fixes the frame size in a form of 2Q, where Q[0 : 15]. Therefore the
maximum frame size represents 32768 slots. (refer to Table 2.2). Lee et al. in [49]
on the other hand, proposed an enhanced method of anti collision by changing the
frame size dynamically by doubling it if 70% of the frame is filled with collision
and dividing it by two if more than 30% of the frame is empty. They claim that
it achieves more than 85% improvement over traditional Frame Slotted Aloha. In
RFID application, the reader will define the frame size, while the tag selects a slot
where it wants to communicate.
Q 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Slots 1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 4096 8192 16384 32768
Table 2.2 – Q vs total slot number
In order to simplify the implementation, Gen2V2 uses the term slot counter to
represent the slot chosen by a tag. As previously mentioned in the last paragraph,
a reader uses a Q value between 0 and 15 to indicate the frame size. A frame size
is therefore between 1 to 2Q. Table 2.2 indicates the total available slots for each
Q value. As an example, when Q=3, the number of communication slots available
is 2Q = 8. Therefore the tag can choose from 1 out of 8 possible slot for it to
communicate with the reader. If the Q value is carefully chosen, the possibility of
having two or more tags that try to communicate at the same time will be reduced.
However, if the number of available slots is smaller than the number of tags, it will
render the system inefficient.
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2.3.4.1 Frame Slotted Aloha efficiency
A theoritical study has been performed to a population of 10 to 100 tags in
order to obtained quantitative results sufficient enough in dimensionning set of
RFID used in AAL [24]. The Frame Slotted Aloha efficiency is based on the
number of tag (n) and the number of slots (N) available. The communication
efficiency between tags within a slot is calculated based on the Equation 2.1.
This efficiency, noted S, is the probability to have a successful transmission.
S =
n(1− 1
N
)n−1
N
(2.1)
The communication efficiency of 10 tags, 50 tags and 100 tags are represented in
the Figure 2.9. As mentionned by Tanenbaum andWetherall in [50], the theoretical
value for the maximum communication efficiency of FSA is at 38.6%. On the same
note, the peak value of the graph moves along the x axis in accordance with the
number of tags corresponding to the total slots available (refer to figure 2.9 and
table 2.3);
Q slots available 10 tags 50 tags 100 tags
2 4 18.7% 0% 0%
3 8 37.5% 9% 0%
4 16 34.9% 13.2% 1%
5 32 23.4% 32.9% 13.4%
6 64 13.5% 36.1% 32.8%
7 128 7.2% 26.5% 35.9%
8 256 3.7% 16.1% 26.5%
Table 2.3 – Efficiency values
As we go further, we notice that to get the maximum efficiency, the total
number of slots available in a frame needs to be as close as possible to the number
of tag. As an examples:
• 8 slots < 10 tags < 16 slots
• 32 slots < 50 tags < 64 slots
• 64 slots < 100 tags < 128 slots.
This value will later be used as the guideline for the implementation of the simu-
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Figure 2.9 – Slotted Aloha Theoretical Efficiency
lation in chapter 3. It is interesting to know if the observation made based on the
theoretical value will correspond to the simulated one.
2.3.4.2 Collision Management Protocol
As previously mentioned, the RFID collision management protocol is based on
the FSA. It uses a slot counter to identify the slot number. In its implementation,
only a tag with a slot counter zero is able to transmit any data. If a tag slot
counter is different than zero, it decreases the slot counter number by one and
wait for the next command. This creates a queue of tags that waits for their turn
to communicate. Figure 2.10 explains the process further.
To start a session, a reader broadcasts a Query request with the frame size
value as a parameter. The frame size is sent as a Q value which represents the
frame size as 2Q. The maximum Q value is set to be 15 at most (which represents
32768 slots). Each tag that receives the Query request generates a random number
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within the frame boundaries that will serve as the slot counter.
If the slot counter is different than zero, the tag decreases the slot counter value
by the decrement of one and waits for the next command from the reader. This
step navigates through all slots of the frame one by one. If the slot counter is zero,
the tag generates another random number (RN16) as a response for the query and
sends it to the reader.
After sending the request, the reader monitors the communication channel to
ensure that only one tag communicates at one time. There are three different
possible scenarios.
The first scenario is when only one tag communicates during a slot. The reader
successfully receives the random number (RN16) sent by the tag and it will echo the
same value back to the tag as an indication that the message has been successfully
received.
The second scenario is when there is a collision. It happens when more than
one tag try to send a message simultaneously. The communication medium is
then flooded with messages that make the signal unreadable for the reader. In
this case, the reader ignores all messages and proceeds with another request called
QueryRep. The QueryRep command indicates to the tag to decrease the slot
counter by one. As mentioned previously, only tags with slot counter equal to zero
can start transmitting data. Therefore this command positioned the tag a slot
nearer to its goal (zero).
Finally, in the third scenario, if there is no communication that occurs during
the slot duration, the reader will wait for a specific time out before broadcasting
a new QueryRep command to all tags.
In any case, a tag will pass through the first scenario where it sends a random
number (RN16) and wait for the answer. We can note also that the second and
third scenario contribute to the communication channel inefficiency where the slot
is not used for any communication. Finally, once the tag receives the acknowl-
edgement command from the reader, it needs to identify itself to the reader. This
identification process will be further discussed in the following section.
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Figure 2.10 – Gen2V2 tag collision management
2.3.5 RFID Identification
Once collisions between tags are avoided, the reader can send the acknowledge-
ment message to the active tag in the current slot. As described in Figure 2.10, the
tag answers with its identity. The tag uses the Electronic Product Code (EPC) [51]
as a unique identification. The EPC covers all type of RFID applications.
The EPC is represented in Internet Uniform Resource Identifier (URI). It is in
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the form of:
urn:epc:id:scheme:12345678.234567.345.xxxx.xxxx
• urn: Uniform Resource Name
• epc: Electronic Product Code
• id: Identity
• scheme: epc format to be used
It is divided into several segments to guarantee the identity uniqueness. The
first three segments are occupied by the EPCglobal standard parameters. It covers
details such as the EPC length, version and generation. The fourth segment refers
to the scheme to be used and the following segments are used for identification
purposes. Scheme refers to the type of EPC implementation, such as for trading
objects, logistics, automotive components, aerospace and defence sector, etc. As
an example, the serialized global trade item number (SGTIN) refers to the trading
item/product code.
The standardisation enhances a cross platform ability and enables the out-
growth of the IoT. Research trends on the fusion of the connected objects within
the current internet network are discussed in [19] and [21]. The results of the
fusion can offer a boom effect to the existing service-oriented application. Despite
the bright future that awaits the IoT, all literatures cited previously had raised
the same concern with regards to the security and privacy in IoT.
2.4 Security
Realising the gap that exists within the EPC C1G2 standard, the Gen2V2
protocol adds several commands to cater the security in RFID tags. Among others
are to validate a tag or a reader during an association between a tag and a reader.
This to ensure that only authorized tag or reader will take part in the conversation.
As RFID relies on the wireless communications, the same access medium is
shared by every user and is therefore more vulnerable to security attacks.
In general, the security threats are classified into two categories: active attacks
and passive attacks as depicted in Figure 2.11 the following sections will discussed
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Figure 2.11 – RFID Security
further these attacks from a general standpoint as they are not specific to the
health domain.
2.4.1 Passive Attack
A passive attack is an attempt to monitor and/or to capture information from
a system. It has no impact on the end to end communication. It can also be
considered as the preliminary step before an active attack where communications
are captured for every transmission on the medium. Among the attacks that are
considered passive are eavesdropping and relay attack.
2.4.1.1 Eavesdropping
Eavesdropping consists of capturing the conversation between two entities. As
depicted in Figure 2.12, a third person behind the wall is secretly listening to Alice
and Bob’s conversation. In RFID, if the gathered data are not encrypted, it can
be used to identify useful information such as the EPC. However, no modification
of the exchanged data is made. Hancke in [52] performs a proof of concept on HF
RFID eavesdropping.
2.4.1.2 Relay attack
The relay attack is the attempt to get access to a secure entity with the help
of a legitimate security device. It is based on the assumption that the legitimate
device must be close to the attacked system. It can enable the opponent to access
the system while the device is not within range. This attack requires at least
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Figure 2.12 – Eavesdropping
two equipments that are able to impersonate the system and the device (refer to
Figure 2.13).
When the adversary wants to access the locked item, it will send a request for
the information from the proximity key through the device#1 which then forward
the information to the device#2. With this given information, the adversary will
finally be able to get into the locked item. It is considered a passive attack as
it does not modify any messages from the actual device and the opponent is not
required to understand the message. Silberschneider et al. in [53] demonstrate a
relay attack using a HF RFID and a smart phone on an access control environment.
Sportiello et al. in [54] give another example of a long range relay attack using
two phones. In the case study performed by Francillon et al. in [55], the relay
attack enables the possibility of stealing a vehicle by using two devices where
an attacker with the first device within the car proximity, while his accomplice
is in close range of the ligitimate car key. The accomplice should be near to the
vehicle owner, therefore within the range of the car key. Therefore trick the vehicle
immobilizer to believe that the vehicle RFID immobilizer.
31
2. STATE OF THE ART
Figure 2.13 – Relay Attack
2.4.2 Active Attack
An active attack is an attempt to modify transmitted information from the
system that is under attack. Its aim is to add, modify or even delete the message.
An attacker can try to impersonate the victim in order to reach his goal such as
having a full access to their personal information. Among the attacks that are
considered active are desynchronization, reflection, man in the middle and denial
of service attacks.
2.4.2.1 Desynchronization attack
In RFID, the desynchronization attack occurs when the adversary tries to dis-
rupt the key updates between tags and reader resulting in the authentication key
to be mismatched and to render the tag unusable. In this context, keys represent
a set of preshared key shared between tags and the reader. Once the key is used,
both tags and reader move to the next key in line. The attack tries to prevent the
key from each side from being of the same sequence. Even though this attack does
not add, modify nor delete any messages, the consequence is that the system will
not be able to recognize the tag. Again, Safkhani et al. [56] is among researchers
that is actively work in finding weakness in RFID Gen2 tags.
2.4.2.2 Man in the middle attack
The man-in-the-middle attack occurs when the adversary managed to be in
between Alice and Bob conversation in real time. As illustrated in Figure 2.14,
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the adversary can pose as Alice when communicating with Bob and act as Bob
when communicating with Alice. However, the adversary is required to understand
the message.
Figure 2.14 – Man-in-the-middle
However, due to its resources limitations, RFID has yet be considered fully
secured [56]
2.4.3 Authentication
Many RFID privacy literatures focused on tag authentication protocols to prove
that the EPC-C1G2 standard has a weak security by applying a cryptanalysis on
a series of authentication protocol and come up with a new solution [57, 58, 59].
Some did not consider reader authentication [58] while some concentrated in timely
mutual authentication [59]. Mutual authentication is considered the best way to
authenticate a communication where both tags and reader are verified. Among
the solutions proposed in improving security by offering mutual authentication is
Chou in [60].
Low cost RFID tags come with limited resources where at most 10000 Gate
Equivalent (GE) is allocated for security purposes [61, 62, 63]. The Gate Equiv-
alent (GE) value is used as a common reference for the performance of different
hardware architecture. GE relates to the area of silicon in µm2 to form a RFID
tag divided by the area of two-input NAND gates as described by Rolfes et al in
[64]. Based on the calculation resources required, the attacks countermeasures can
be divided into four categories:
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• Full-fledged is the ability to perform one-way cryptography (such as hashing
encryption), symmetric encryption (such as AES) or public key algorithm.
• Simple is the ability to calculate both random number function and hash
function.
• Lightweight is the ability to formulate both PseudoRandom Number Gen-
erator (PRNG) and Cyclic Redundancy Code (CRC)
• Ultra-lightweight is the ability to perform bit-wise operation suc as XOR,
AND and OR.
Figure 2.15 – RFID tag security classification
As mentioned in Figure 2.15, if the tag is capable of performing a full fledged
cryptography, it could easily compute a random number, a hash function, CRC
and bitwise operations. The same would go to the simple category where it could
easily perform the CRC and bitwise operation and so forth.
To improve the security of passive RFID tag, Gen2V2 adds nine cryptographic
encryption suites within its specification to allow authentication as an optional
extension of ISO/IEC 18000 series. The full list of the possible implementation
of crypto suite within the Gen2V2 passive RFID can be found in the ISO/IEC
29167-1 [65] which encompasses AES128 [66], PRESENT-80 [67], ECC-DH [68],
Grain-128A [69], AES OFB [70], XOR [71], ECDSA-ECDH [72], cryptoGPS [73],
RAMON [74]. It must be noted that a tag can use only one of the cryptographic
suite that is selected during its manufacturing.
Four of the crypto suites will be described in the following section where
34
2.4. SECURITY
AES128 implementation has been chosen to represent the de facto standard in
security. It has been selected among numerous proposals to the US government
to replace its previous encryption method called DES that is dated from 1977. It
is widely used by other well-known technologies for embedded connected devices
like Bluetooth, Zigbee and WiFi. AES implementation prototype in RFID has
been performed by Moradi et al. in [75] and Ertl et al. in [76], however, their
prototypes are based on the C1G2. PRESENT-80 [77] is an example of a block
cipher. It has been chosen for its similarity to AES but requires less resources
(lightweight) thus suitable to most RFID. XOR on the other hand, is suitable for
low cost passive tag due to its simplicity and finally, cryptoGPS is an example of an
asymmetric cryptography that offers a highly secure authentication. The explana-
tion of the cryptographic suites will be based on the improvement done in Gen2V2
as in Figure 2.16 where the CSI (Cryptographic Suites Indicator) represents the
authentication identification.
Figure 2.16 – Gen2V2 Improvement
2.4.4 Advanced Encryption Standard: AES128
AES128 [78] is a part of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) crypto-
graphic algorithm defined in [79] that is a symmetrical block cipher. It uses a set
of substitution and permutation of a fixed block of 128 bits.
To ensure that the tags are capable of performing the required calculation,
the smallest size of possible key is selected among the 128, 192 and 256 bits key
size/length.
Since RFID tag resources are limited, lower GE value is preferable. Fu et al.’s
proposed an implementation of AES128 authentication in [80] and showed the
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cost to be at 4952 GE, [63] at 3400GE and Moradi et al. in [75] at 2400 GE.
The input to be encrypted by the AES is arranged in a set of bytes as the basic
unit of processing. It is then represented in a 4x4 matrix. This input will then be
copied in a state array. All AES operations will be performed on the state array,
the result will then be copied in the output array. (refer to Figure 2.17)
Figure 2.17 – Tag authentication using AES128
The tag authentication is performed based on a challenge and response ex-
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change with a preshared key as described in the Gen2V2 improvement in Figure
2.16. The explanation of this section is based on the Figure 2.18.
Figure 2.18 – Authentication protocol exchange between reader and tag for AES128
in Gen2V2
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To begin, the reader generates and sends an 80 bits random number called
’IChallenge’ along with a reference keyId as an authentication request (refer to
table 2.4).
The keyId is a preshared key identifier from a key table that is preloaded in the
tag beforehand, either during fabrication or during the tag implementation within
the system. This prevents any preshared key to be transmitted in an unencrypted
form through the wireless channel.
AuthMethod CustomData RFU KeyId IChallenge
bits 2 1 5 8 80
Table 2.4 – AES128 Authentication request format
Once the tag receives the authentication message request, (see section 2.4) it
prefixes a 16 bits constant having a value of 96C5h called ’c’, a 32 bits random
number (RN) generated by the tag itself and the 80 bits IChallenge received. All
together it forms the 128 bits input matrix. This input matrix is then copied to the
state array and undergo a bitwise XOR operation with the first roundKey. This
represents the first round of state array as mentioned above. The result will then
go through a substitution box (refer to table 2.5) that replaces each byte with a
substitute value. Each line of the matrix is then shifted to the left corresponding
to the line index as described in table 2.6.
The state matrix then goes through a mix column process (refer to table 2.7)
before going through the bitwise XOR again but with an updated key for the
round. The process is repeated for 10 rounds.
The result is then concatenated to a 16 bits constant (C) and a 32 bits random
number. The tag finally sends this response (Challenge) to the reader. The reader
decrypts the response by inverting the process and retrieves both ’C’ and ’Chal-
lenge’. The tag authentication is considered successful if both values are identical
for the reader and the tag.
2.4.5 PRESENT-80
PRESENT is a lightweight symmetrical block cipher proposed by Bogdanov et
al. in [77]. Its implementation requires only 1570 GE (Gate Equivalent). Gen2V2
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y
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f
x
0 63 7c 77 7b f2 6b 6f c5 30 01 67 2b fe d7 ab 76
1 ca 82 c9 7d fa 59 47 f0 ad d4 a2 af 9c a4 72 c0
2 b7 fd 93 26 36 3f f7 cc 34 a5 e5 f1 71 d8 31 15
3 04 c7 23 c3 18 96 05 9a 07 12 80 e2 eb 27 b2 75
4 09 83 2c 1a 1b 6e 5a a0 52 3b d6 b3 29 e3 2f 84
5 53 d1 00 ed 20 fc b1 5b 6a cb be 39 4a 4c 58 cf
6 d0 ef aa fb 43 4d 33 85 45 f9 02 7f 50 3c 9f a8
7 51 a3 40 8f 92 9d 38 f5 bc b6 da 21 10 ff f3 d2
8 cd 0c 13 ec 5f 97 44 17 c4 a7 7e 3d 64 5d 19 73
9 60 81 4f dc 22 2a 90 88 46 ee b8 14 de 5e 0b db
a e0 32 3a 0a 49 06 24 5c c2 d3 ac 62 91 95 e4 79
b e7 c8 37 6d 8d d5 4e a9 6c 56 f4 ea 65 7a ae 08
c ba 78 25 2e 1c a6 b4 c6 e8 dd 74 1f 4b bd 8b 8a
d 70 3e b5 66 48 03 f6 0e 61 35 57 b9 86 c1 1d 9e
e e1 f8 98 11 69 d9 8e 94 9b 1e 87 e9 ce 55 28 df
f 8c a1 89 0d bf e6 42 68 41 99 2d 0f b0 54 bb 16
Table 2.5 – AES: Substitution Box
(a) before
S0,0 S0,1 S0,2 S0,3
S1,0 S1,1 S1,2 S1,3
S2,0 S2,1 S2,2 S2,3
S3,0 S3,1 S3,2 S3,3
(b) after
S0,0 S0,1 S0,2 S0,3
S1,1 S1,2 S1,3 S1,0
S2,2 S2,3 S2,0 S2,1
S3,3 S3,0 S3,1 S3,2
Table 2.6 – AES: Shifting columns to the left
(a) before
S0,0 S0,1 S0,c S0,3
S1,0 S1,1 S1,c S1,3
S2,0 S2,1 S2,c S2,3
S3,0 S3,1 S3,c S3,3
(b) after
S0,0 S0,1 S
′
0,c S0,3
S1,0 S1,1 S
′
1,c S1,3
S2,0 S2,1 S
′
2,c S2,3
S3,0 S3,1 S
′
3,c S3,3
Table 2.7 – AES: MixColumns
privileged the 80 bits preshared key as compared to the 128 bits preshared key due
to the resource constraint. PRESENT-80 uses 64 bits data block with a 80 bits
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preshared key as described in [67].
Once the RFID tag is identified, the reader is able to start an authentication
session with it to further enhance the security. The chronogram in Figure 2.19
helps to highlight the communication exchanges. Figure 2.20 illustrates the overall
process.
Figure 2.19 – PRESENT-80: Protocol exchange between reader and tag
As described in [77] and further explained in [67] the PRESENT-80 requires
31 rounds of substitution and permutation of the plaintext. It uses a 64 bits round
key, with a 42 bits challenge. In every round, the tag performs an exclusive OR
(XOR) between the round key and the received challenge.
The round key changes in every round. The first round key is the 64 most
significant bits of the 80 bits preshared key. As described in [67];
presharedKey1 = key79key78key77...key0 (2.2)
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Figure 2.20 – Tag authentication using PRESENT80
roundKey1 = key79key78key77...key16 (2.3)
To get the next round key, a 61 bit shift to the left is applied to the current
preshared key and became the presharedKey2 (cf Equation 2.4). The round key
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became the Equation 2.5.
presharedKey2 = key18key17key16...key19 (2.4)
roundKey2 = key18key17key16...key35 (2.5)
The outcome is then passed through a substitution box (as in Table 2.8) and a
bit permutation box (as in Table 2.9) as defined by the authors in [77]. Considering
P(i) is the permutation box formula, it is calculated by adding the quotient of i
when divided by four, plus the remainder or the division multiply by 16 (refer to
Equation 2.6 deduced from table 2.9).
P (i) =
⌊
x
4
⌋
+ (x mod 4) ∗ 16 (2.6)
x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F
S(x) C 5 6 B 9 0 A D 3 E F 8 4 7 1 2
Table 2.8 – PRESENT-80 Substitution box
i 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
P(i) 0 16 32 48 1 17 33 49 2 18 34 50 3 19 35 51
i 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
P(i) 4 20 36 52 5 21 37 53 6 22 38 54 7 23 39 55
i 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47
P(i) 8 24 40 56 9 25 41 57 10 26 42 58 11 27 43 59
i 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63
P(i) 12 28 44 60 13 29 45 61 14 30 46 62 15 31 47 63
Table 2.9 – PRESENT-80 permutation box
Finally, the result from the substitution and permutation is sent back to the
reader as the authentication response. The reader inverses the process and verifies
if the challenge in the tag response corresponds to the challenge value that has
been previously sent.
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2.4.6 XOR
As described in the chronogram in Figure 2.21, the crypto suite based on the
exclusive OR (XOR) operation for tag authentication is implemented after the
initial exchange in the inventory phase. It is simple to be implemented and does
not require a lot of resources. The process depicted in Figure 2.22 requires only an
addition and the XOR operation. To encrypt the plaintext message, the algorithm
uses a preshared key called PSK and a constant value of 5555 5555 5555 5555h
called ’On’. The verification is based on the exchange value passed between the
reader and tags. The values come from a XOR operation between the random
number (RN), the constant ’On’ and the PSK.
Figure 2.21 – XOR: Protocol exchange between reader and tag
The reader starts the authentication process by sending a SRNi value computed
using a random number generated by the reader and the constant ’On’. The SRNi
calculation is represented in Equation 2.7.
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Figure 2.22 – Tag authentication using XOR
SRNi = (RNi+On)
⊕
PSK (2.7)
Upon reception of the challenge message, the tag performs a XOR operation
with its preshared value, resulting in the XOR of the random number and the On
value. To obtain the random number sent by the reader, the tag needs to remove
the On number from the total (refer to Equation 2.8).
RNi = SRNi
⊕
PSK −On (2.8)
Once the random number from the reader is known, the tag computes the total
summation of ’1’ in the binary value of the random number. As an example, a
value of 13 in binary is 1101, therefore the total iteration of ’1’ is three. By using
the total iteration value, it performs a bitwise rotation to the left on the random
number and the preshared key in order to get both RNi’ and PSK’.
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With the help of these new values, the tag finally computes SORNi by per-
forming a XOR operation between the total of the shifted preshared key with the
On constant and the shifted random number (refer to Equation 2.9) and sends it
back to the reader.
SORNi = (PSK ′ +On)
⊕
RNi′ (2.9)
In order to authenticate the tag, the reader performs the bitwise rotation on
both its random number and the preshared key to get the RNi’ and PSK’. It
performs a XOR operation between the received message and the RNi’ (as in
Equation 2.10). It also calculates the sum of PSK’ with the constant value On (as
in Equation 2.11).
SORNi
⊕
RNi′ (2.10)
PSK ′ +On (2.11)
The reader then compares results from the Equation 2.10 and the Equation
2.11. As a consequence, the tag is authenticated if the results are identical.
2.4.7 cryptoGPS
Named after the its inventors, Girault, Poupard and Stern, cryptoGPS is a
lightweight asymmetric identification scheme based on an elliptic curve discrete
logarithm problem (ECDLP).The prefix crypto is added to their acronym to avoid
confusion from the Global Positioning System (GPS). Its implementation standard
is defined in [73]. Prior to the standardisation, an example of the implementation
is performed by Poschmann et al. in [81] which shows that the implementation
requires between 2000 - 3000 GE. The cryptoGPS elliptic curve is represented in
the Equation 2.12. A list of precomputed coupons is stored within the tag to
minimize the calculation effort by the tag.
y2 = x3 + ax+ b (2.12)
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To begin with, both reader and tags are required to refer to the same elliptic
curve E with a field size of q, a base point P and a multiplier s. Any random
point V on the curve E is equal to the multiple of base points P as presented in
Equation 2.14.
V = −[s]P (2.13)
= (xv, yv) (2.14)
In the asymmetric cryptography, we consider V as the public key and s as the
private key. Due to the complexity of its calculation, CryptoGPS uses preloaded
coupons on the tags before using them. This is comparable to AES where it
preloads its keyID beforehand as mentioned in section 2.4.4. These coupons consist
of a set of precomputed data in a form of (ri, Xi). The coupon is a one-off coupon
that can only be used once. Figure 2.23 highlights the authentication process.
To start the authentication process, the reader sends an authentication request
to the tag. Once the tag receives the request, it chooses a coupon Xi and sends
it to the reader. When the reader receives Xi, it retrieves randomly a challenge
c from its list of challenge and sends it to the tag. The tag computes and sends
y according to Equation 2.15 where ri is within the coupon selected, s is the
private key and c is the challenge received. The protocol exchanged is presented
in Figure 2.24
y = ri + c ∗ s (2.15)
Upon reception of y, the reader can deduce the ri value according to Equation
2.16.
r′i = y − c ∗ s (2.16)
With ri the reader can then findXi’ and compares it toXi. If they are identical,
the tag is then authenticated.
Having presented the four main cryptographical suite algorithms used in the
authentication of the Gen2V2 RFID tags, the following section will deal with
the main mecanisms of localization that are employed in locating the RFID tags.
The selected crypto suites will be implemented in the simulation and will then be
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Figure 2.23 – CryptoGPS Commitment Challenge Response (CCR)
further evaluated in chapter 3.
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Figure 2.24 – cryptoGPS: Protocol exchange between reader and tag
2.5 2D Tag Localization
Tag localization is a research subject on its own. In this work we only focus
in 2D localization. Numerous works have been done on different methods used to
estimate the exact coordinates of a passive RFID tag. To name a few, Azzouzi et
al. in [82] proposed the positioning of a tag based on the received signal using three
antennas. The experiment requires a reference signal to be compared with. At the
accuracy of 0.21 meter, it is vulnerable to multipath signal that can interfere in
the calculation. Wang et al. in [83] on the other hand, offered an accuracy of 0.49
meter with an approach consisting of a mobile reader. The system estimates the
distance based on the combination of the signal power and the angle of the signal
received. Choi et al. in [62] proposed the use of the signal strength to estimate
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the distance between a tag and a reader. The system designates several reference
tags with known distances to help in estimation of the actual distance. The result
of the signal from the tag to be positioned is then compared to the said reference.
The error estimation of the system is at less than 0.21 meter. Recently, Zhao et
al. in [84] proposed to group a set of tags based on their distance. However their
precision is within 0.50 meter. Finally, Scherhaufl et al. in [85] demonstrated a
2D indoor localization based on the phase of the signal received with the help of
reference tags. The error estimation of this implementation is at 0.01 meter.
As stated above, most localization techniques are based on physical character-
istics of the signal travelling from the object to the receiver. Among the character-
istics that are looked into are the different levels of the received signal strength, the
time taken by the signal to travel from the source to the destination, the different
angles of the received signal and the different phase of the received signal. Most of
the localization methods are based on the comparison of the different values from
different sources. The following section discussed the trilateration technique used
to locate the object.
2.5.1 Trilateration
Trilateration is a concept of finding the position of an object based on three
measurements [86, 87]. It calculates the intersection of three signal ranges centering
at three different readers. To ease the presentation we will assume that the signal
coverage can be depicted as a circle xxx if due to signal propagation in a real
environment this range looks like a elipsoïde, The radius of the circle represents the
distance of the tag from each reader. Therefore, before any trilateration calculation
can be performed, the system requires that each reader provides its estimated
value. Once ready, the reader sends to the system its coordinates and its distance
from the tag as an update. From there, the system can calculate the estimated
location of the tag.
The computed distance metrics by readers are based on various methods such
the Time of Flight(ToF), the Received Signal Strength (RSS), the Angle of Arrival
(AoA) and the Phase of Arrival (PoA). All methods will be presented in the
following sections :
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2.5.1.1 Roundtrip Time of Flight (RToF)
Figure 2.25 – Roundtrip Time of Flight
The Time of Flight (ToF), also known as Time of Arrival (ToA), refers to the
time taken by the signal to travel from the source to the destination. As mentioned
by Shen et al. in [88], it requires that the transmitter and the receiver are
synchronized. Unfortunately, it is difficult to maintain the clock synchronization
of a set of tags. However, since the reader is able to record the time when it
sends a message and the time it receives the response, the Roundtrip Time of
Flight (RToF) can be computed easily. It refers to the time taken by the signal to
travel from the source to the destination and to return back to the source. ToA
is then calculated by dividing by two the time taken to make the journey back
and forth between the reader and the tag (refer Equation 2.17) assuming that the
communication conditions are the same for both request and response.
ToA = RToF2 (2.17)
To get the actual propagation time between the reader and the tag, we deduct
the duration required to transfer both messages and divided the rest by two (refer
Equation 2.20). The distance can be deduced by multiplying the propagation time
(tProp) with the signal propagation rate (see Equation 2.21).
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totalDuration = tProp + durationMsg1 + tProp + durationMsg2 (2.18)
2 ∗ tProp = totalDuration− durationMsg1− durationMsg2 (2.19)
tProp =
totalDuration− durationMsg1− durationMsg2
2 (2.20)
distance = tProp ∗ propagationRate (2.21)
2.5.1.2 Angle of arrival (AoA)
Figure 2.26 – Angle of Arrival
Angle of Arrival (AoA) refers to the angle of a signal from a source to arrive
to the receiver/sensor. The angle is calculated based on a reference plane which is
normally the horizon. Basic trigonometric definition gives;
tan(α1) =
h
d1
(2.22)
tan(α2) =
h
d2
(2.23)
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d1 + d2 =
h
tan(α1)
+ h
tan(α2)
(2.24)
d1 + d2 =
h ∗ tan(α2) + h ∗ tan(α1)
tan(α1) ∗ tan(α2) (2.25)
d1 + d2 =
h ∗
(
tan(α2) + tan(α1)
)
tan(α1) ∗ tan(α2) (2.26)
h = (d1 + d2)(tan(α1) ∗ tan(α2))
tan(α2) + tan(α1)
(2.27)
(2.28)
once h is known, it is applied in Equation 2.22
d1 =
h
tan(α1)
(2.29)
Considering Reader 1 as the reference point, the tag coordinates can be deduced
by:
Tcoord = (xR1 + d1, yR1 + h) (2.30)
However, this method is not suitable for indoor purposes as the signal can be
reflected by various obstacles. Further details on the advantage of using TDoA
over AoA can be found in [89].
2.5.1.3 Received Signal Strength (RSS)
RSS estimates the distance based on the signal strength where the higher the
signal, the closer the distance. However, the RSS alone can not guarantee the
accuracy of the localization as other factors such as signal absorption, signal angle
and signal reflection can impact the measured RSS. Alvarez Lopez et al. in [90]
deployed a system with RSS with a combination with the AoA. Others like Choi
et al. in [62] and Wang et al. in [83] are among the researchers who used RSS as
the only method to locate a passive RFID object.
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2.5.1.4 Phase of Arrival (PoA)
Phase of Arrival (PoA) estimates the length of multiple propagation paths by
the backscattered tag signal to the receiver. To achieve this, Scherhaufl et al.
in [85] used an antenna and series of passive tags. Hekimian Williams et al. in
[91] added that the accuracy of PoA experiments is within milimeters.
2.5.2 Trilateration calculation
Once the distance estimation between each reader and the tag is known (refer
to the following section), we can calculate the estimated coordinate by considering
the reader 1 as the reference point. We have several known parameters such as
all readers coordinates: (x1, y1, z1), (x2, y2, z2), (x3, y3, z3) and the distance from
reader to tag: r1, r2 and r3.
As described in Figure 2.27, r1 is the distance from tag to reader1, r2 is the
distance from tag to reader2, r3 is the distance from tag to reader3. Several other
constatation can be retreived within the same figure such as:
x2 = x1 − d (2.31)
x3 = x1 − i (2.32)
y3 = y1 − j (2.33)
The following calculation will be done by considering x1 = x and the solution
of the intersection of the three circles is the estimated position of the tag.
(r1)2 = x2 + y2 + z2 (2.34)
(r2)2 = (x− d)2 + y2 + z2 (2.35)
(r3)2 = (x− i)2 + (y − j)2 + z2 (2.36)
To get the x coordinate, we subtract the Equation 2.34 from the Equation 2.35
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Figure 2.27 – Trilateration
(r1)2 − (r2)2 = x2 − (x− d)2 (2.37)
(r1)2 − (r2)2 = x2 − (x2 − 2xd+ d2) (2.38)
(r1)2 − (r2)2 = 2xd− d2 (2.39)
x = (r1)
2 − (r2)2 + d2
2d (2.40)
x is known since the distance between the tag and different readers (r1, r2, r3) and
the distance between R1 and R2 (d) are known. To get the y value, we substitute
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the Equation 2.36 with the Equation 2.34
(r3)2 − (r1)2 = (x− i)2 + (y − j)2 + z2 − (x2 + y2 + z2) (2.41)
(r3)2 − (r1)2 = x2 − 2ix+ i2 + y2 − 2jy + j2 + z2 − x2 − y2 − z2) (2.42)
(r3)2 − (r1)2 = −2ix+ i2 − 2jy + j2 (2.43)
2jy = (r1)2 − (r3)2 + i2 + j2 − 2ix (2.44)
y = (r1)
2 − (r3)2 + i2 + j2 − 2ix
2j (2.45)
Where i, the signed magnitude for x
i = ex ∗ (R3 −R1) (2.46)
with the use of unit vector for x axis:
ex =
R2 −R1
||R2 −R1|| (2.47)
and j, the signed magnitude for y,
j = ey ∗ (R3 −R1) (2.48)
and the unit vector for y axis.
ey =
R3 −R1 − iex
||R3 −R1 − iex|| (2.49)
We finally have the tag coordinates:
Tagcoord = R1 + xexx+ yeyy (2.50)
xTag = x1 + xexx+ yeyx (2.51)
yTag = y1 + xexy + yeyy (2.52)
Ko [92], Fortin-Simard et al. [93] and Zhao et al. [94] are among other authors
that work with the said method. In the next section, localization of objects and
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the persons as well as the respect of privacy will be presented.
2.6 Privacy
Today’s advanced technologies enable the collection of personal data into mul-
tiple databases. This can be done easily. Information such as name, date of birth,
age and marital status are among the common ones but it does not just stop there
as other personal data such as medical history and financial history are also easily
accessible.
This section will discuss further on what is privacy, how private data are col-
lected and how to manage the possibility of revealing a person’s identity through
multiple databases. Also discussed are the localization privacy with RFID tags,
the threats and the definitions of privacy in the context of RFID.
The term privacy is used to represent the ability of a person to choose either
to share or not to share his personal information such as health status, financial
details, their whereabouts, interests, political affiliation, etc.
The individual should also be able to decide between which information and
until what level of details he is willing to release and share with others. The indi-
vidual should be able to share that he is in a shopping mall without the obligation
to detail out the people he met, the shops he went to, the items he purchased and
their price. He can merely choose to share that he went to the shopping mall for
window shopping.
In the era of information technology, details such as name, gender and interest
are the most common items collected through various media. The social media
such as Facebook and Tweeter advocates the simplicity to identify a person. Some
are willing to share their current location, mainly during their vacation, family
trip or honeymoon. The motivation is essentially to share their happiness with
their relatives or close friends. Some are willing to share the restaurant that they
have visited. Some like to give feedbacks on the food they just ordered. However,
the same person can also be reluctant to share the location he went to, to prevent
any embarrassment, or whenever he needs to be left alone.
Most of the information gathered are not straight forward. Data are processed
to find the association between the individual and the overall data collected. As
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an example, the health status can be deduced by the type of medication taken by
the individual or the visit frequency to a medical practitioner.
Not everybody is willing to share their health status with the public as it can
be considered as very personal. The severity of the disease is not the measure
either to share or not to share the information. Either if it is benign or serious,
the individual should always have the control to decide whether to share or not
his condition with anybody.
On the other hand, the association to a medical record can be done by de-
tecting items within the same location as the individual. A group of drugs can
identify a specific health problem. This can lead to a discrimination towards an
individual from a specific service. Therefore to ensure the privacy of an individ-
ual, it is required to handle personal related data without the possibility to make
a deduction towards the owner of the object. The ability to identify an object
and an individual will open the possibility of profiling and tracking an individual.
As a rule of thumb, an enforcement can be done by either to render the data
to be anonymous [95, 96], or to change the identification of the object on every
transaction (pseudonym) [97].
An example of possible data collection which is often overlooked by everyone;
public transport companies usually store their customers’ details and travelling
logs to optimise their services; such as to either adding or reducing their fleet. On
the other hand, collected data can create an opening in identifying to a certain
extent, the workplace and the residence of an individual where his daily commute
can indicate the stations served in the morning from his home and the reverse flow
in the afternoon from his workplace.
Juels in [98] stated that two main concerns in privacy is the unauthorized
tracking and inventorying. As an example, tracking could be done by associating
the credit card with the item purchased and inventorying is the act of listing the
items attached to a person such as member cards and loyalty cards. The author
then mentioned that RFID tags are easy to duplicate as it is just strings of bits
without any real access-control mechanisms. However, it limits the adversary to
be physically close to a tag/reader. To enable privacy, the author listed several
methods such as tag killing or tag sleeping that render the tag to be unusable.
This method however, withdrawn the ability to identify a sold item from the
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aftersales services. Another method described was the minimalism that releases
different pseudonyms for every request. Therefore an unauthorized reader could
not correlate the different pseudonyms with a single tag. To further enhance the
protection, tags should limit their responses when queried hastily.
2.6.1 Localization Privacy with RFID tags
It is common nowadays to tag everyday items with RFID tags. With the help
of a reader, one could identify, communicate, read/write and locate a tag. And
data gathered from the tag could provide vital information of an individual.
Figure 2.28 – Localization privacy topology
As an example, at home, a different group of items in a wardrobe could indicate
the age range of a person, their specific interests in a brand of perfume, clothes
and accessories. As illustrated in Figure 2.28, once a reader detects a tag, it relays
the information to a server. The server serves to stores all tag information in its
database. This information can lead to stereotyping a person. A free Internet
connection provided by a shopping mall could help to locate a person in the mall.
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With a set of free Internet access points, they could track the customer’s where-
abouts within their premise and therefore identify their interests. The duration of
a person passing through the section could show their level of interest in certain
things. This information could help the management of the mall to go about on
how to arrange their goods. This, however, only applies to a device owned by
customers which is equipped with a WiFi connection. On a bigger scale, every
details gathered throughout the year could help to identify the person’s residence,
workplace, meeting locations, favourite restaurants, ideal routes, medical condi-
tions, etc. This information is useful to improve specific services in the long run,
but on the other hand, could also be used against the owner.
The scariest scenario is when a malicious person can continuously monitor
individual’s movement. It can lead to discrimination and an opening towards
various crimes such as theft, blackmail, kidnapping or even murder. Therefore it
is to the best of our interest to prevent this scenario from happening.
In the next subsection, the RFID localization privacy threat and ways to min-
imise the risk will be discussed.
2.6.2 Privacy Threat in RFID localization
RFID tag technology is vulnerable due to the inheritance of the wireless com-
munication technologies’ drawback. Any entity within the range of communica-
tion could capture information exchanged during the conversation. Non-protected
communication could lead to clandestine inventorying, object tracking and up to
identity stealing.
As anybody can hear every conversation within its range, it is possible to
log the data exchange between the two speakers. The recorded data can then be
compared with other related data that could reveal certain details. This situation is
considered as a threat towards privacy. Such practice could disclose the following:
• Identity - By definition, every RFID will reply to a query request sent by
a reader [47]. The default response could include the identification of the
tag. If it is not well prepared and not encrypted, any entity within the
range is capable of collecting the tag identifications.
• Location and time information - By default, there is no protection for the
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communication medium. Therefore, any reader within the range could eas-
ily collect data with regards to the time and the position from the tag.
• Transaction History - Transaction history can give a trail of association
between the owner and their sensitive data. This can reveal their where-
about within the system. Any entity can log details during a non-encrypted
operation.
It is important to understand that a basic RFID tag does not protect the
privacy of an individual. The use of RFID tags could expose specific details of
a person without his knowledge. It is required to fulfill the following criteria to
maintain the RFID tag privacy;
• anonymity - the ability of not being known, identified or tracked
• pseudonymity - the ability of not using the real name or identity
• unlinkability - the ability of not being able to specify the relation of two or
more items
• observability - the ability of not being observed
All these criteria relate closely to the tag identity. If the identity is unknown,
it could not be identified. Therefore it becomes anonymous and it is unlinkable to
any other data. If it could not be linked, it could escape from being observed in
the long run. However, is there any way to ensure that only the authorised person
could identify a tag? The answer will be discussed in the following subsection.
2.6.3 RFID Privacy Definitions
Numerous researches discussed the formal RFID security and privacy model
elaborately. Significant researches have been done on the existence of privacy
within the RFID system [99]. Among topics discussed are the possible definition
of a strong privacy. Juels and Weis in [99] define that a RFID system is considered
private if no adversary has a non-negligible advantage in successfully guessing a
specific tag identity. Vaudenay in [58] on the other hand, described that a strong
privacy is not possible if the adversaries can corrupt any tags and read the return
channel. Among the primary concern of a RFID privacy is on how to avoid the
traceability of a tag [100]. However, Lu et al. in [101] highlight that a strong
privacy have a scalability issue if the system is to be implemented in larger scale.
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The authors then proposed a weaker definition to reduce the overhead and the
delay of the implementation. It relies on the principle that a tag will produce
a different output whenever it is interrogated by a legitimate reader in order to
minimize the correlation between two sessions.
As mentioned previously, a RFID system requires a tag and a reader. And the
definition of an adversary is required to address the malicious party.
• A tag (T ) is an entity with limited storage resources and limited calculation
performance. It has the possibility to provide secrets. It is equipped with
a session identifier and is able to carry a cryptographic key [99]. The
combination helps to increase the difficulty in guessing the secret key. On
the other hand, it requires a particular intention to avoid corrupted tags
[102].
• A reader (R) initiates a session and sends a challenge to a tag. Based
on the response from the tag, it could then decide either to continue or
to terminate the communication session. Most of the current authenti-
cation methods rely on this challenge-respond definition. Either it uses
a pseudorandom generator, hashing function, symmetric cryptography, or
asymmetric cryptography.
• An adversary definition varies a lot from one literature to another. Each
tries to bring forward an issue that is not covered by the other. In general,
an adversary can perform basic actions such as eavesdropping the commu-
nication channel. However, it can also perform advanced actions such as
query inititation, message generation, send a challenge and response, data
modification, query replay and set a secret key.
A more elaborate definition of the formal model assumes the existence of
different set of adversary that could perform actions such as monitoring all
communication channels, corrupting tags and tracking tags within a limited
period [58].
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, the general overview of IoT is discussed along with its applica-
tion in AAL. Explanation on the RFID standard, classification and identification
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is given. The RAIN RFID tag collision management is introduced to depicts the
medium access control that is used in a multi user environment and that serves as a
root for every communication including localization. The security in RFID which
includes the passive and active attacks along with the authentication process are
discussed. Apart from that, a presentation of the tag localization and privacy has
also been done.
Having seen these, chapter 3 will give a clear insight of the work performed to
model and implement a new RFID framework within the OMNET++ simulator
as well as its anti-collision management, security features, localization and finally,
the localization privacy.
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This chapter presents a newly created Gen2V2 framework within OMNET++.
This framework serves to simulate the Gen2V2 Layer 2 exchanges that are not
currently addressed in OMNET++. On top of that, an implementation of a new
security module of several cryptographical suites defined in the protocol standard
is proposed. Finally, a new module of tag localization is implemented. It will
be a new localization privacy solutions. First, a presentation of the OMNET++
structure and items required to set up a project within OMNET++ will be dis-
cussed. The newly created framework will required a validity test to ensure that
its functionalities correspond to the standard protocol. Therefore, the framework
protocol validity is then checked through the anti collision management that is
discussed in the previous chapter. This phase is critical to ensure that the results
correspond to the theoretical values. Once validated, four algorithms presented in
the previous chapter are then implemented within the framework to enhance its
security especially for the authentication of the reader/tags. To further investigate
the Gen2V2 characteristics, a radio medium is introduced within the protocol to
simulate a wireless environment. The addition of a wireless environment within the
framework enables the creation of an adversary entity that can passively eavesdrop
any conversations on the shared medium. This adversary will be used to evaluate
the security of the localization protocol.
3.1 OMNET++
At the beginning of this thesis, three years ago, none of the network simu-
lators had a RFID model implemented, not even the RFID C1G2 standard. At
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that point of time, OPNET [103], NS3 [104] and OMNET++ [105] were the best
candidates among the existing simulators because they met all the main criteria
needed for the automate or code modelization. Furthermore, they have the wire-
less communication features. OMNET++ has finally been selected for this work
because of its modular framework which permits easier customization. On top of
that, it has a powerful Graphical User Interface (GUI) which makes tracing and
debugging tasks easier. Despite having the best GUI among the three, OPNET
was not chosen because of it cost.
OMNET++ is a discrete event simulator. It is primarily designed to cater as
a network simulator. However, its’ modular approach enables other opportunities.
The framework coding is done in C++, and it is free for non-commercial use.
OMNET++ offers a different framework that covers computer network from
the underlying network protocol such as UDP, TCP, IP, IPv6, PPP, and Ethernet.
It also includes an advanced system such as Wireless Sensor Network (WSN),
Controller Area Network (CAN), vehicle network, cloud computing systems and
satellite systems. However, there is no known framework that caters for RFID.
Nevertheless Godor et al. works in [106] on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
for RFID have been successfully simulated in OMNET++.
3.2 OMNET++ structure
The advantage of OMNET++ is the possibility to design the framework in
modular basis. Each module can be customized to match specific requirements.
A particular protocol layer can be defined as a simple module (example in code
3.2).
In order to properly set up a project in OMNET++, at least a network defini-
tion and a simple module file are required. Other components that can be defined
within a project are a compound module and a communication channel. To present
further the structure, each item is explained in the following subsections.
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3.2.1 Network definition files (NED)
A project in OMNET++ requires a network definition structure called NED
(NEtwork Definition). This file defines the network structure with several elements
such as parameters, gates, connections and submodules. It can be edited in a text
format using any text editor or configured through the OMNET++ graphical user
interface is in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1 – OMNET++: network definition in graphical user interface (GUI)
In the code sample 3.1, a sampleNetwork is defined. The network consists of
two nodes named node1 and node2 that want to communicate with each other.
Both nodes are represented with submodules based on a simple module named
Node, the bi-directional communication is enabled with gates in and out in both
submodules.
package sampleNetwork;
network SampleNetwork {
submodules:
node1: Node;
node2: Node;
connections:
node1.out --> node2.in;
node1.in <-- node2.out;
}
Code 3.1 – network definition in text mode
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3.2.2 Simple module
The most typical component in OMNET++ is called a simple module where basic
behaviors are set. To communicate with other modules, it uses dedicated gates
and a communication channel as depicted in Code 3.2 and Figure 3.2.
simple Node {
gates:
input in;
output out;
}
Code 3.2 – Node.ned Figure 3.2 – Simple module
3.2.3 Compound module
A compound module defines the common parameters, the submodules, the input
and output gates to the module and the communication channel parameters be-
tween each submodules (example in code 3.3). It is a combination of multiple
"simple modules" such as described in Figure 3.3. It enables the creation of hier-
archical layers of communication. Each object can have separate modules such as
identification, mobility, network layer, etc. Each module can communicate with
other modules by sending a message through the dedicated gates.
3.2.4 Communication channel
A Communication channel can be defined as a full duplex link or as a half duplex
link. The advantage of the half duplex as in the code example 3.4 is that both
channels can be set differently. The communication channel can represent various
medium. It can be used to mimic the physical conditions of every communication
technologies such as Bluetooth, Zigbee or WiFi by changing few parameters namely
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module moduleCompound {
parameters:
gates:
output out;
input in;
submodules:
subModule1: SimpleModule1;
subModule2: SimpleModule2;
connections:
subModule1.out --> subModule2.in;
subModule1.in <-- subModule2.out;
}
Code 3.3 – Compound module Figure 3.3 – Compound module
connections:
node1.out --> {delay=10ms; ber=1e-8;} --> node2.in;
node1.in <-- {delay=12ms; ber=1e-8;} <-- node2.out;
Code 3.4 – Basic communication channel example
the propagation delay, the data rate, the bit error rate (BER) and the transmission
power.
3.2.5 OMNET++ coding
Once the network is defined, the protocol functionality is programmed in C++.
As a discrete event simulator, OMNET++ reacts based on events triggered by
the exchanged messages between modules or submodules. These messages pass
through the input and output gates and can be retrieved using the "handleMes-
sage(msg)" function. By means of this function, conditioning can be performed
based on the message received.
3.2.6 OMNET++ troubleshooting
OMNET++ has the ability to record the program execution step by step. It
generates a sequence chart throughout the program execution. The sequence chart
as in Figure 3.4 can help in visualizing the exchanged messages sequences between
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entities. All communications pass through the radio layer before being sent to their
respective node to be processed further in time. In our example, a tag, a reader
and an adversary are represented in two layers. At event #22, the reader[0] sends
a Query request to tag[0] through its radio submodule. At event #23 its radio
submodule forward the request to the tag[0] radio submodule. The request arrived
at event #24. Noted that the same request is captured by the adversary radio
submodule at even #25. After receiving the request at event #28, the nodeTag
do not respond to the request. The sequence can help to identify if the node is
not responding to conditionning of the message as per written in the program. In
this case, it is due to the fact that the condition to respond is not met. Further
detail on why it is not met will be discussed in the next section.
Figure 3.4 – OMNET++: Event Log
The troubleshooting of the protocol chronograms has been done based on the
sequence chart in Figure 3.4 and the work is also presented and discussed in the
next sections.
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3.3 Gen2V2 framework
OMNET++ does not offer any RFID framework, let alone the Gen2V2. In or-
der to study the passive RFID behaviour within OMNET++, the EPC Gen2V2
[47] specification is examined. The corresponding scenario depicted in Figure 3.5
and Figure 3.6 are then built within OMNET++. The implementation of both
scenarios helps to differentiate the most efficient technique of the two. The initial
Gen2V2 framework consists of creating two entities: a reader and a tag. Both
required to be declared in a network definition file (explicitly "Gen2V2.ned" as
depicted in code 3.5) to define the network between the two entities.
Figure 3.5 – Scenario 1: QueryAdjust at the end of the frame
The establishment of both modules "Tag.cc" and "Reader.cc" is then carried out
in order to define their functionalities. Both are required to introduce a "han-
dleMessage()" function in order to manipulate the received messages and to act
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Figure 3.6 – Scenario2: QueryAdjust right after collision
accordingly. At this stage, the reader communicates directly with each tag through
its input and output gate. As depicted in Figures 3.5 and 3.6, both tag and reader
are needed to handle the exchanged messages. Figure 3.5 depicts the first scenario
where a QueryAdjust is called at the end of a frame if any collision occurs during
the session. On the other hand, the second scenario presented in Figure 3.6 called
the QueryAdjust immediately after a collision occurs without waiting for the end of
the session. The difference in terms of efficiency results between the two scenarios
has been discussed in section 2.3.4.
At first, the reader sends a Query request in order to initiate a session as passive
tags are unable to do so. It should be able to transmit the QueryRep if no tag is
responding within the time limit or when there is a collision. At this stage, only
the tag with a slot counter equals to zero will start transmitting the QueryReply
message (Tag#1 in Figure 3.6). The Acknowledgement (ACK) is sent if the reader
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received an answer from a tag. The random number request (Req_RN) is sent
if the reader successfully received the tag identity (PC/XPC, EPC). If there is a
collision that occurs within the frame, the QueryAdjust is sent.
network Gen2V2 {
parameter:
int numTags = default (1);
submodules:
tag[numTags]: Tag;
reader: Reader;
}
Code 3.5 – Gen2V2.ned
On the other hand, the tag needs to manage the generation of a 16 bits random
number to be sent to the reader as the first communication. It is done through the
QueryReply process. Upon reception of ACK message from the reader, the tag will
send its identity (PC/XPC, EPC) to the reader. Finally, the reader confirms that
it receives the identity through a request, of another random number (Req_RN)
from the tag. The tag will generate another 16 bits random number and send
it back to the reader. This random number will be used as a reference for the
following communication of the session.
3.3.1 Gen2V2 hierarchy
A new network definition file is redefined in order to ensure the possibility to easily
improve the framework. In order to do so, submodules that characterize a protocol
layer and an authentication layer (refer to code 3.6) are created.
It is then interpreted as the NodeTag and NodeReader that define the protocol
layer and the authenticationTag and authenticationReader that serve as the au-
thentication layer. The hierarchical method will render any modification to the
current framework to be an easy task as it is treated in a modular manner. Any
additional functions such as mobility can be added at this level in the future.
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module moduleTag {
parameters:
@networkNode;
gate:
input in @directIn;
submodules:
nodeTag: NodeTag;
authenticationTag: AuthenticationTag;
connection:
nodeTag.toAuth --> authenticationTag.fromTag;
authenticationTag.toTag --> nodeTag.fromAuth;
}
Code 3.6 – moduleTag.ned Figure 3.7 – ModuleTag Topology
simple nodeTag {
parameters:
gate:
input in;
output out;
}
Code 3.7 – nodeTag.ned Figure 3.8 – NodeTag Topology
3.3.1.1 Module: ModuleTag
The objective of the tag’s main module is to orchestrate the information between
submodules and to define how they communicate. In the example given below
(refer to Code 3.6 and Figure 3.7), the nodeTag is directly connected to the au-
thenticationTag. Two communication channels are defined to establish the back
and forth connection.
The main functionality of a tag is confined within the nodeTag submodule. All
messages received by tag are evaluated and performed within this submodule’s
coding (refer to Code‘3.7 and Figure 3.8).
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3.3.1.2 Submodule: authenticationTag
To complete the implementation, an authentication submodule is created and
added to the framework. A network definition for the submodule is then de-
fined based on AES128 (section 2.4.4), PRESENT80 (section 2.4.5), XOR (section
2.4.6) and cryptoGPS (section 2.4.7). The selected cryptographical suite is then
implemented within the submodule coding and each of them is verified through
their official test vectors [66, 67, 71, 73, 107]. The choice of cryptographical suite
is then configured through a variable named cryptosuiteID that offers an option
within the parameters segment (refer to Code 3.8).
simple AuthenticationTag {
parameters:
int cryptosuiteId:
gates:
input fromTag;
output toTag;
}
Code 3.8 – authenticationTag.ned
void AuthenticationTag::handleMessage(cMessage *msg) {
if (strcmp(msg->getName(), "AuthRequest") == 0) {
if (cryptosuiteId = XOR) suiteXOR;
else if (cryptosuiteId = PRESENT80) suitePRE80;.
else if (cryptosuiteId = AES128) suiteAES128;
else if (cryptosuiteId = cryptoGPS) suiteCryptoGPS;
}
}
Code 3.9 – authenticationTag.cc
3.3.1.3 Submodule: Radio Medium
A shared communication medium is added to complete the simulated scenario.
An open source model suite called the "INET" [108] offers a radio medium func-
tionality within the OMNET++ simulator. It delimits the shared medium by
supervising messages through radios and tracking the ongoing transmissions. The
model defines the communication parameters such as the propagation rate and
delay (refer to Code 3.10). At this stage, no external noise has been considered.
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The addition of the shared medium submodule requires some modification within
the framework. Various signals are needed to ensure its functionality. Each signal
defines its operation state. The reception state informs reception availability, either
it is buzy or ready to received any signal. The signal transmission state is used to
inform that it is ready to transmit or that it is already buzy sending messages.
parameters:
@signal[receptionStateChanged];
@signal[transmissionStateChanged];
Code 3.10 – Parameter update for radio medium
3.3.1.4 Module: adversary
Once the communication between the reader and tags has been established, the
framework becomes more elaborated with the addition of the authentication and
the implementation of the radio medium. The adversary submodule is then added
to complete the framework with the ability to eavesdrop communications through
the shared medium. However, with the current implementation, man-in-the-
middle attack can be added to the framework through this module.
3.4 Anti-collision management
In addition to the message administration, the reader handles collisions by detect-
ing if there is more than one tag trying to send their response at the same time.
As previously mentioned in section 2.3.4, the frame size is defined by a Q value
, where 2Q represents the number of slots within a frame. The association time
is calculated from the first request sent by reader in the first slots until the last
message received from the last tag in the last slot of the frame. The reader is
required to wait for a certain period of time also known as timeout before sending
a new request indicating the beginning of the next slot. Therefore, even if the slot
is free, the reader still requires to allocate a certain amount of time to ensure that
the slot is not in use. The overall number of collisions for different number of tags
with different values of Q is represented in Figure 3.9. Note that the choice of
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frame size depends on the number of tags. If the frame size is too low, the number
of collision increases and a retransmission is required, resulting in an increase of
the duration to associate the group of tags.
Figure 3.9 – Collisions vs Q values
A bigger frame size does reflect less collisions. However, it does not represent the
best solution for the system as presented in Figure 3.10 where tag assocication
duration keep increasing after a certain Q value. As an example, for 100 tags,
the duration increases exponentially after Q is equal to 7. Therefore, even with
800 collisions as in Figure 3.9, Q=7 still represents the fastest time to interrogate
100 tags. This enforces the previous efficiency theoretical representation in Figure
3.12.
As described in Figure 3.11, if the reader is receiving a message, it is considered
as busy and a collision is detected. The reader will then discard any incomplete
message and will send a QueryRep to re-initiate the request. Otherwise, it will
proceed to the next stage.
To validate the framework, a comparison of the efficiency result from the simulation
and the Frame Slotted Aloha (FSA) theoretical value is performed (refer to section
2.3.4). The Figure 3.13 represents the channel utilization efficiency of 100 tags at
different frame sizes (frame size is equal to 2Q). Note that the simulated value of
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Figure 3.10 – Total duration of association
Figure 3.11 – Reader’s collision management
the scenario 1 (in red triangle) represented in Figure 3.5 is similar to the theoretical
FSA values (in black circle) thus validating our implementation. In addition, the
simulation also gathers a second result from scenario 2 (in green square) as per
Figure 3.6 where the reader restarts another frame immediately after a collision.
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Figure 3.12 – Slotted Aloha Theoretical Efficiency
The result shows that scenario 2 requires a bigger frame to achieve the maximum
efficiency therefore not matching the theoretical FSA value. In other words, it is
not the best way to implement the protocol.
Once the framework is validated, the implementation of the four cryptographical
suites can be made in the proposed Gen2V2 framework.
3.5 Cryptographic Suites within the framework
The major improvement of Gen2V2 from the previous passive RFID version is
the implementation of nine cryptographical suites within the protocol. It requires
both tag and reader to indicate which cryptographical suite to be used. A modi-
fication of the tag and the reader initial module within the framework is needed.
A hierarchical component is required to address this changes. It reflects a new
definition structure to cater this new functionality.
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Figure 3.13 – Efficiency comparison with 100 tags
3.6 Cryptographical suites evaluation results
The framework helps to evaluate the impact of the authentication protocols re-
sponse on the system time. The performance is evaluated based on the duration
required to perform all message exchanges without considering the time to per-
form the authentication calculations. The evaluation includes all four encryptions
suites presented in section 2.4. The curves in Figure 3.14 and Figure 3.15 illus-
trate the average time needed to perform the association of every tag using the
cryptographical suites mentioned above and will be discussed further in the next
subsection.
3.6.1 Evaluation parameters
Each simulation parameter is set within omnetpp.ini The 95% confidence interval
is performed to validate the result where thirty rounds [109] of simulation with dif-
ferent seeds of random numbers are executed. The first line described the number
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of the random seeds required. The seed is then applied to the nodeTag and the
nodeReader respectively. To perform the simulation, a bitrate is set to simulate
the transfer speed, the number of reader is set, the number of tags can also be
defined.
3.6.2 Framework execution
The execution start time is recorded and used as the baseline. The execution
finish time is also recorded in order to get the overall duration as in Figure 3.10.
It reflects the duration required to perform all message exchanges.
A start time at the beginning of each cryptographical suite is also registered along
with the end time. The difference of the two enables the calculation of the au-
thentication duration as depicted in Figure 3.14 and Figure 3.15.
3.6.3 Simulation results
In order to validate our results, the performance of the tag association without
any authentication is used as a baseline. The execution duration to associate
all tags through different cryptographical suite is then recorded and compared to
the baseline. Figure 3.14 and Figure 3.15 depict the result of the authentication
simulation where each curve represents the duration required to finish interrogating
20 tags and 100 tags. Note that both figures have similar pattern as Figure 3.10
where the duration increases with the size of the frame.
The additional duration observed is due to the authentication and is inline with
the amount of data exchanged between the tag and the reader during the authen-
tication process (refer to Table 3.1).
PRESENT80 XOR AES128 cryptoGPS
R to T (bits) 112 139 160 72
T to R (bits) 121 121 185 465
Total 233 260 345 537
Table 3.1 – Bit exchange between tag and readers
As expected, the authentication takes an additional time to be performed. At first,
PRESENT80 seems to be the best solution as it impacts the less the association
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Figure 3.14 – Authentication duration for 20 tags
time. But even with an additional time cost cryptoGPS is still a relevant candidate
as it relies on an asymmetric algorithm which is known to be more secure than
symmetric one, where secret key is shared between the two entities. Furthermore,
cryptoGPS authenticates both the reader and the tag while others only perform
the tag authentication.
In the next section, the RFID localization will be further explained and elaborated.
The section will cover from the implementation of the RFID up to the results
gathered from the simulation.
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Figure 3.15 – Authentication duration for 100 tags
3.7 RFID localization
A trilateration method is a suitable solution to perform localization of a RFID
tag as discussed in section 2.5. It requires three readings from three different
readers that are at known positions and are assumed to remain still. All readers
are required to report their distance to the tag to localize. As readers do not have
any intelligence, it is therefore a necessity to have a central entity to gather these
measurements and to perform the localization. A server module is then created
for this purpose. It has the task to coordinate the query requests from all readers
to avoid unnessary collisions and to collect all the feedbacks. No communication
error is considered between the server and the reader. The Figure 3.16 depicts
the implementation used in this work in order to locate a tag. The server serves
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to calculate the location of a tag based on the distance feedback from the three
different readers. Noted that the medium implemented at present is considered
as perfect and without any interference. The following section will introduce the
server module in detail.
Figure 3.16 – Localization Topology
3.7.1 Module: Server
The server coordinates the communication initiation by the readers towards RFID
tags. It has the possibility of requesting a reader to collect information from
the tags. The information are updated regularly by the readers through dedicated
gates. Code 3.11 helps to understand how to automate and connect multiple gates
definition without the need to set the gate explicitly. First, the number of readers
is defined in "parameters" segment. The creation of the same number of input
and output gates is defined in the "gates" segment. In the segment "connections",
the link betwwen the server and all readers are configured through a loop of a
number of readers. Noted that communications between the server and readers
are performed through a wired network that is assumed to be secured.
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module ModuleServer {
parameters:
int numReaders = default(1);
gates:
input fromReader[numReaders];
output toReader[numReaders];
submodules:
nodeServer: NodeServer;
localization: Localization;
connections:
for i=0..numReaders-1 {
fromReader[i] --> nodeServer.fromReader[i];
toReader[i] <-- nodeServer.toReader[i];
}
nodeServer.toLocalization --> localization.fromLocalization;
nodeServer.fromLocalization <-- localization.toLocalization;
}
Code 3.11 – moduleServer.ned
3.7.2 Submodule: localization
The localization submodule is added to the server module to benefit its ability to
gather information from various readers one by one to avoid possible collisions. If
only one reader exists, the position of the tag is estimated on a circle around the
reader with a radius of the gathered distance. Having two readers give the oppor-
tunity to have two possible coodinates on the intersection of the two circles. The
ideal case is when there are three circles (as in Figure 2.27) that enable the system
to perform the trilateration calculation as described in Section 2.5 and illustrated
in Figure 3.16. At this stage, no external noise is taken into consideration within
the radio medium. Therefore the communication signals are not modified in any
way. Thus the three circles will intersect with each other.
There are three different approaches in the implementation of the localization
submodule. The first and the third scenario are the continuation of the validated
framework. The second requires a major change in the coordination of how the
reader associate with a tag Therefore, the RFID standard validity is unknown for
this second scenario, hence not implemented in the current framework.
The summary of all three scenarios are presented within Figure 3.17 where at
the end of each scenario, the server is able to gather information as in Table 3.2.
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Readern Reader2 Readern
Tag1 distancer1t1 distancer2t2 distancerntn
Tag2 distancer1t2 distancer2t2 distancernt2
  
Tagn distancer1tn distancer2tn distancerntn
Table 3.2 – Tag distance from readers
Basically, scenario 1 and scenario 2 require the server to wait for all readers to
finish locating all tags before it is able to calculate the location. This is due to the
fact that the reader is coordinated consecutively to associate all tags, while the
rest of the readers remain inactive. In scenario 3, the server receives the distance
updates from all readers eventhough they are not the active one that interrogates
the tag. All inactive readers within the communication range that receive the
communication from the tag should now send a feedback to the server. This
passive detection is depicted as dotted squares in figire 3.17. Therefore, the server
is able to interprete the tag position much earlier in this scenario comparing to the
other two. In this scenario, reader#2 and reader#3 are not required to interrogate
the tag in order to estimate their distance. All simulations are performed with the
optimum Q value obtained in Section 2.3.4.
3.7.2.1 Scenario 1: Wait for all tags
The first scenario localize a tag after all readers have completed the interrogation
of all tags. Therefore, to be able to locate a tag, the server is required to wait for
all tags to be detected by all readers. This specific operation requires the sum of
time needed to detect all tags in all readers which can be presented as
LocatizationT ime =
m∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
rjti (3.1)
where m is refering to the number reader, n is refering to the number of tags
and ti is the time taken to associate a tag. The detail of the process of reader1
interrogating two tags is depicted in Figure 3.18. First, the server initiates a
startQuery that indicates reader1 to start interrogating the tags. Reader1 will
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Figure 3.17 – Scenario summary
then proceed to interrogate all tags within its range by following the FSA principle
as discussed in Section 3.3 before sending a notification to the server stating that
it has associated all tags. The server will repeat the process with all readers until
it receives feedbacks of the corresponding distances between every tags and every
readers as depicted in Figure 3.19. The server then compile all results in the
localization calculation.
3.7.2.2 Scenario 2: Tag by tag
In the second scenario, the server requests a reader to interrogate every tag one
by one. This implementation is however not included within the framework since
it is not scalable. It does not comply with the current standard that associates
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Figure 3.18 – Scenario 1: Reader1
all tags within its range before proceeding to the following reader. It also requires
a radical change in the current framework. In scenario 1, the server initiates a
reader to start sending query to the tags and the rest of the process is done by
the reader. If the second scenario is to be implemented, the reader needs to be
reconfigured to only forward all the query requests when it is told to do so and the
server is required to manage the slot counter of each readers. As a consequence,
a bigger number of readers creates a bottleneck to the system due to excessive
communication between the server and the readers. The time taken to locate a
tag is reduced to:
LocalizationT ime =
m∑
i=1
ti (3.2)
However as depicted in Figure 3.17 the total duration to localize the same group
of tags remains the same as the first scenario since all readers are required to
interrogate the tag one by one with all tags in the group (refer to Equation 3.1).
Note that in overall, only tag sequence is changed. The duration required to locate
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still remain the same. Therefore no further investigation will be proceeded.
As mentioned in Figure 3.20, the server can perform the localization calculation
once all the readers have updated their distance from a specific tag. Opposing to
the previous scenario, the time taken to locate a tag does not require the server
to wait for the discovery of the total number of tags. However, the total duration
to locate a set of n tags in scenario 1 and scenario 2, requires the same amount of
time as illustrated in Figure 3.17.
Figure 3.20 – Scenario 2: Tag by tag
3.7.2.3 Scenario 3: Realtime update
The third method is a variation of the first scenario where readers are in charge
of all requests and slot counters (refer to Section 3.3). In addition, it uses every
messages exchanged in order to determine the distance between the reader and
the tag as described in Figure 3.21. The server initiates the tag interrogation
sequence and receives timely feedbacks from each reader for every messages send
by tags. The server will then calculate the time difference between feedback to
indentify the RToF (refer to section 2.5.1.1) and to deduce the ToA by subtracting
the messages and its overhead from RToF. This methodology reduces the time
required to localize a tag to a strict minimum. The server can start calculating
the localization with the first query response from the tag. This solution is the most
efficient of all three specified in this section. As described in previous scenario, if
the duration to interrogate a tag is equal to ttag, the time needed to localize a tag
should be less than ttag.
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Figure 3.21 – Scenario 3: All readers update tag location actively
3.7.2.4 Localization results
The results gathered from simulations presented in the Figure 3.22 confirm the
affirmation stated in Section 3.7.2.3 that scenario 3 is the best scenario among
the three propositions. A sample of 10 to 100 tags has been chosen to identify
the divergence of the simulations. The most optimum frame size is used for each
number of tags. As an example, for 100 tags, the best value for scenario 1 is at
almost 5 ( the same value found in Figure 3.15) and at almost 15 for scenario 3.
It is observed that the improvement performed by the scenario 3 over the scenario
1 tripled. This is due to the fact that in scenario 1, all readers are required to
interrogate all tags as compared to the scenario 3 where only one reader actively
interrogates the tag to gather related information for localization calculation. The
rest of the readers are only required to update the server when they received the
messages transmitted by the tag and the distance between the reader and the tag is
calculated by the server accordingly before proceeding to localization calculation.
The scenario 2, on the other hand, will produce the same result as scenario 1 as the
server still requires all readers to interrogate all tags even though the sequencing
is different.
Localization is subject to multiple security issues, among which is the privacy vio-
lation. Indeed, the tag identity communication within Gen2V2 protocol exchanges
is vulnerable to eavesdropping. Therefore the identity is easily captured during
the communication. Thus, the importance to carry out an improvement to the
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protocol to hide it. In the next section, we will address this issue.
Figure 3.22 – Localization duration
3.8 RFID tag privacy
By default, RFID communications are not secure. The conversation is transparent
to anybody within the communication range. In Gen2V2 [47] protocol, when a
reader sends a query to a tag, the tag will respond with a freshly generated RN16.
The reader will receive the tag identification by returning the RN16 back to the
tag. Therefore, any reader could collect this information without any difficulty.
This could leave a trace of tag identification along with its movement.
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The Gen2V2 protocol standard introduced an optional command called "untrace-
able". It helps to hide some details of the tag identity. Yet, it requires prior
authentication process to secure the tag. This authentication in itself is optional.
Consequently, a tag with or without authentication has already exposed its iden-
tity. Hence, it is vulnerable to traceability attack.
Figure 3.23 – Best case scenario: Communication exchange in Gen2V2 protocol
In this work, we proposed to anonymize the tag identity by introducing AES128
encryption as described in Section 2.4.4 into the identification process. The idea
is that, when a tag sends its identity to a reader, every entity within the com-
munication range can hear it, therefore an encryption of the identity can hide its
real value. AES128 is just an example to enable a prove of concept of the idea.
However, the encryption results produce the same output if the input is the same.
As a result if an adversary wanted to located a tag, it can refer to a series of tags
having the same encrypted identity. Hence, eventhough the real identity is not
revealed, the tag location can be deduced by performing any localization method
described in Section 2.5 . In order to overcome this problem, the proposed work
applies a XOR operation between the real identity with the random number pro-
duced previously during the QueryResponse operation. The result of the XOR
operation is then introduced to the AES128 encryption and is later sent to the
reader. The reader will then send the ciphertext to the server along with the other
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parameters.The server will then be able to decrypt the ciphertext given by the
reader using the shared key and the given random number.
Another concept is by using a set of pseudonym. A pseudonym concept is when
an object has several identifications. The authorized entity should have the list of
the alias (either precalculated or not). Without the list, the unauthorised party
would have difficulties to trace the object. The idea is to use several secret keys
along with the tag identification. This is rather different than using a separate
identification for the same tag such as in [110]. However, it requires the server to
store a list of hashing codes in its database. The downside of the protocol proposed
is the system demands more time to identify a tag. This can affect the scalability
of the system as it requires a significant overhead as described by Alomair et al.
in [59].
3.9 Localization privacy
At this point, the framework is implemented, tested and able to localize tags. The
localization depends on the signal received and the identification of the object. The
main idea to maintain privacy is to prevent the tag from simply giving away its
identification to any reader, either it is authorized or not. One of the implemented
cryptographical suites has been chosen to hide the identification by encrypting
the EPC within the limit of the standard. The proof of concept of the proposed
solution involves the utilisation of AES128 to encrypt the identification in order
to make it more difficult for the reader to identify the tag. The AES128 has been
chosen due to its popularity among ubiquitous systems. However, its encrypted
output is not varying if the input is fixed (in this case the identification). Therefore,
the same outcome is expected if no modification is done to the input. In order to
get a different result with the same identification, an exclusive OR is performed
to the identification (EPC) using the random number (RN16) used in the first tag
reply as shown below.
input = RN16⊕ EPC (3.3)
output = encryptAES128(input, presharedKey) (3.4)
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Figure 3.24 – Localization Privacy Topology
By performing this, every request for a tag identification will result in a completely
different identification. Thus, as illustrated in Figure 3.24, the adversary can only
detect that there are several tags around him without knowing their true identity
nor to the fact that they represent only one tag. On top of that, if there is a set
of readers to identify the tag, they will not be able to refer to a specific tag due
to the different identities provided by the same tag, hence rending the localization
by more than one reader to be impossible.
Within the authorized system, the server decrypts the encrypted identification
using AES128 with the pre-shared key. An exclusive OR is then performed on the
result with the random number given in order to get the identification.
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output = decryptAES(input, presharedKey) (3.5)
EPC = RN16⊕ output (3.6)
3.10 Conclusion
In this chapter a new Gen2V2 framework is built within the OMNET++ sim-
ulator. Every details of the framework implementation is presented. First, is
the implementation of FSA protocol to simulate the anti-collision management.
Its performance is observed, a comparison between implementations of the frame
is also performed and compared against the theoretical values. In addition, the
implementation of four cryptographical suites is done to evaluate and measure
their impact on the authentication process. The communication overhead per-
formance are also evaluated. Prior to that, the cryptographical suites have been
verified through a series of known test vectors to ensure the confirmity of the im-
plemented algorithm. Finally three possible scenarios of the RFID localization
are proposed and compared. The framework is thus ready to be used as a plat-
form to investigate the localization privacy. The identity manipulation within the
implemented protocol helps to increase privacy in the localization. Moreover, it
reduces the precision by reducing the ability to triangulate the object by more
than one reader. Up until the manuscript is written, the implemented framework
represents over 7000 lines of codes and keeps increasing. The codes are available
at https://github.com/Ahmad2015/Secure_RAIN_RFID-.
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4.1 Conclusion
The Ambient Assisted Living provides numerous opportunities in bringing comfort
to an elderly person. It helps them to be less dependant to other people and delays
or even ceases the needs for some of them to go to a retirement home. However,
the uncertainty of the security and privacy of the underlying technology hinders
them from adopting the solution. Therefore, some improvements within the area
is needed in order to reassure new/potential adopters.
The goal of this work is to provide a new method to improve privacy during the
localization process. The method proposed proves that by sending a different
identification to each communication session, it will render the localization of an
object to be imprecise. As noted previously, a reader can sense the presence of a
tag whenever the tag is within its range. Therefore, it can deduce that the tag is
nearby. However, with the presence of hundreds of tags within its surrounding at
most time, it is nearly impossible to detect any specific tag among them.
In order to prove that the proposed method can enchance the privacy during
the passive tag localization, a new Gen2V2 framework has been modeled within
OMNET++ simulator. The newly created framework validation proves that its
communication efficiency is in concordance with the theoretical value of the Frame
Slotted Aloha protocol implemented within the Gen2V2 tag standard.
With the help of a radio medium framework already implemented within the OM-
NET++, the Gen2V2 framework is able to simulate the wireless communication
channel where any forms of communication can be heard by anybody within range.
This functionality enables the simulation of request broadcasts by the reader and
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the response backscattered by tags. It also enables the implementation of an ad-
versary within the framework where every conversation is recorded.
The implementation of the four cryptographical suites within the framework
demonstrates the possibility to increase the security at a small cost. Each crypto-
graphical suites is validated by its known test vectors. It is implemented through
a separate module that can be used or reused by any other modules. By taking
the advantage of the existing cryptographical suites, an additional procedure used
to hide the real identity of a tag during the communication also proves that the
localization privacy can be improved without major modification to the current
RFID tag protocol.
4.2 Prespectives
4.2.1 Short term perspectives
The newly developped framework within OMNET++ is limited to only four cryp-
tographical suites among nine available for the Gen2V2 tags. Therefore to fully
compare all cryptographical suites proposed within the standard, the implementa-
tion of remaining cryptographical suites is required. This will enable the investiga-
tion of different matrix such as the amount of data exchanged or the total duration
to finish the reader/tag association. An addition of other cryptographical suites
can also help to decide the best option to hide the tag identity.
The current Gen2V2 framework localizes a tag based on the Time of Arrival (ToF).
As it is not the only way to locate a tag, an implementation of other methods can
be carried out in the near future. This can help in investigating other options to
ensure the localization is permissible to the authorized parties only. Among other
methods used to locate a tag that can be looked into are the use of the signal
strength, the angle of arrival or a hybrid of two or more methods. The mobility
module has been implemented within the framework, however, it is set to be static.
A localization privacy of a mobile tag can be interesting to investigate.
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4.2.2 Long term perspectives
Although the localization privacy is tightly related to the AAL domain as it is
specifically associated to human lives, it can also serve other close related domains
such as eMedicine and eHealth or to the IoT itself in general.
There are numerous areas that require improvements due to the RFID tag limita-
tions. The IoT implementations are in a rapid expansion, however, that the future
of localization privacy within IoT is a necessity in order to ensure the security and
privacy of the users are not neglected.
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Omnetpp.ini
[General]
num-rngs = 2
**.nodeReader.rng-0 = 0
**.nodeTag.rng-0 = 1
seed-0-mt = ${ seed0 = 74593..171163 step 3330 }
seed-1-mt = ${ seed1 = 100235..228995 step 4440 ! seed0 }
**.headerBitLength = 1b
**.bitrate = 40kbps
**.numReaders = 1
**.numTags = ${ ntag=20..100 step 20 }
**.rQ = ${ Q = 3..15 step 1}
[Config NoAuth]
**.CryptoSuite = 499
[Config PRESENT80]
**.CryptoSuite = 402
[Config XOR]
**.CryptoSuite = 406
[Config CRYPTOGPS]
**.CryptoSuite = 408
[Config AES128]
**.CryptoSuite = 400
Code 1 – Simulation parameters in omnetpp.ini
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Test vector PRESENT-80
Plaintext Key Ciphertext
00000000h || 00000000h 00000000h || 00000000h || 0000h 5579C138h 7B228445h
00000001h || 00000001h 00000000h || 00000000h || 0000h 086FC044h 9733895Bh
00000001h || 00000001h 00000000h || 00000000h || 0001h 65249D8Fh 0626D7FDh
FFFFFFFFh || FFFFFFFFh 00000000h || 00000000h || 0000h A112FFC7h 2F68417Bh
00000000h || 00000000h FFFFFFFFh || FFFFFFFFh || FFFFh E72C46C0h F5945049h
FFFFFFFFh || FFFFFFFFh FFFFFFFFh || FFFFFFFFh || FFFFh 3333DCD3h 213210D2h
Test vector cryptoGPS
curve P-19
E : Y 2 = X3 − 3X + b overFq
q = FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFE FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
b = 64210519 E59C80E7 0FA7E9AB 72243049 FEB8DEEC C146B9B1
Base point P over E.
P = (xP ,yP )
= (188DA80E B03090F6 7CBF20EB 43A18800 F4FF0AFD 82FF1012,
07192B95 FFC8DA78 631011ED 6B24CDD5 73F977A1 1E794811)
n is the order of point P.
n = FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF 99DEF836 146BC9B1 B4D22831
The bit length of the cryptoGPS private key is σ = |n| = 192 bits.
Private key
s = 4F1DF03A A32DCA02 652E83E7 E5FF5259 D61F5563 B3A0FA10
Public point
V = –[s]P
= (xV ,yV )
= (D753BF14 9529BC23 B1850A37 57C4D34A 0D686A95 C3B03855,
1656B8CB 2896BFD4 BC8F94A8 F3708741 B954CC44 4FC3951A)
Step a
r is a fresh string of random bits
r = 05E8B1 E1121B08 FB9A0F58 FC1E932F 9CEFE94D 629BC223 40B5F04B
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554DCD2B C812A76D 98F8BA3E
[r]P = (DAD48D02 4B83E223 4C0F5FFF B51C15B7 1D52CF92 B35358CF, FFE42756
843D0DF8 F3166971 E8AF6E22 6FD381B0 A816720F)
Step b
X = 04 DAD48D02 4B83E223 4C0F5FFF B51C15B7 1D52CF92 B35358CF FFE42756
843D0DF8 F3166971 E8AF6E22 6FD381B0 A816720F
Step c, d
Verifier’s challenge:
c = 2D F0F5B4F2
Step e, f
z = 2D F0F5B4F
y = 5E8B1 E1121B08 FB9A0F67 2ED9CE48 044BD618 3242087C ADDDA392
F2CA1F36 FDD94248 E8485D5E
Step g
Verification:
X* = 04 DAD48D02 4B83E223 4C0F5FFF B51C15B7 1D52CF92 B35358CF
FFE42756 843D0DF8 F3166971 E8AF6E22 6FD381B0 A816720F
Authentication is valid.
AES Test vector
PLAINTEXT: 00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff
KEY: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
round[ 0].input 00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff
round[ 0].k_sch 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
round[ 1].start 00102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f0
round[ 1].s_box 63cab7040953d051cd60e0e7ba70e18c
round[ 1].s_row 6353e08c0960e104cd70b751bacad0e7
round[ 1].m_col 5f72641557f5bc92f7be3b291db9f91a
round[ 1].k_sch d6aa74fdd2af72fadaa678f1d6ab76fe
round[ 2].start 89d810e8855ace682d1843d8cb128fe4
round[ 2].s_box a761ca9b97be8b45d8ad1a611fc97369
round[ 2].s_row a7be1a6997ad739bd8c9ca451f618b61
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round[ 2].m_col ff87968431d86a51645151fa773ad009
round[ 2].k_sch b692cf0b643dbdf1be9bc5006830b3fe
round[ 3].start 4915598f55e5d7a0daca94fa1f0a63f7
round[ 3].s_box 3b59cb73fcd90ee05774222dc067fb68
round[ 3].s_row 3bd92268fc74fb735767cbe0c0590e2d
round[ 3].m_col 4c9c1e66f771f0762c3f868e534df256
round[ 3].k_sch b6ff744ed2c2c9bf6c590cbf0469bf41
round[ 4].start fa636a2825b339c940668a3157244d17
round[ 4].s_box 2dfb02343f6d12dd09337ec75b36e3f0
round[ 4].s_row 2d6d7ef03f33e334093602dd5bfb12c7
round[ 4].m_col 6385b79ffc538df997be478e7547d691
round[ 4].k_sch 47f7f7bc95353e03f96c32bcfd058dfd
round[ 5].start 247240236966b3fa6ed2753288425b6c
round[ 5].s_box 36400926f9336d2d9fb59d23c42c3950
round[ 5].s_row 36339d50f9b539269f2c092dc4406d23
round[ 5].m_col f4bcd45432e554d075f1d6c51dd03b3c
round[ 5].k_sch 3caaa3e8a99f9deb50f3af57adf622aa
round[ 6].start c81677bc9b7ac93b25027992b0261996
round[ 6].s_box e847f56514dadde23f77b64fe7f7d490
round[ 6].s_row e8dab6901477d4653ff7f5e2e747dd4f
round[ 6].m_col 9816ee7400f87f556b2c049c8e5ad036
round[ 6].k_sch 5e390f7df7a69296a7553dc10aa31f6b
round[ 7].start c62fe109f75eedc3cc79395d84f9cf5d
round[ 7].s_box b415f8016858552e4bb6124c5f998a4c
round[ 7].s_row b458124c68b68a014b99f82e5f15554c
round[ 7].m_col c57e1c159a9bd286f05f4be098c63439
round[ 7].k_sch 14f9701ae35fe28c440adf4d4ea9c026
round[ 8].start d1876c0f79c4300ab45594add66ff41f
round[ 8].s_box 3e175076b61c04678dfc2295f6a8bfc0
round[ 8].s_row 3e1c22c0b6fcbf768da85067f6170495
round[ 8].m_col baa03de7a1f9b56ed5512cba5f414d23
round[ 8].k_sch 47438735a41c65b9e016baf4aebf7ad2
round[ 9].start fde3bad205e5d0d73547964ef1fe37f1
round[ 9].s_box 5411f4b56bd9700e96a0902fa1bb9aa1
round[ 9].s_row 54d990a16ba09ab596bbf40ea111702f
round[ 9].m_col e9f74eec023020f61bf2ccf2353c21c7
round[ 9].k_sch 549932d1f08557681093ed9cbe2c974e
round[10].start bd6e7c3df2b5779e0b61216e8b10b689
round[10].s_box 7a9f102789d5f50b2beffd9f3dca4ea7
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round[10].s_row 7ad5fda789ef4e272bca100b3d9ff59f
round[10].k_sch 13111d7fe3944a17f307a78b4d2b30c5
round[10].output 69c4e0d86a7b0430d8cdb78070b4c55a
XOR Test vector
Tag authentication
The following example uses a 64-bit Key and a 64-bit random number.
PSK d4f625e4 122688af
RNi 1ba58677 7e45a0e7
SRNi a40cfe28 c1bc7d93
SORNi 204bb61f 654744d0
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Résumé
Internet des objets (IoT) est actuellement à notre portée. De nombreux do-
maines ont bénéficié de cette technologie. Cela va d’une application simple,
comme l’identification d’un objet jusqu’à la gestion d’un système plus complexe.
L’identification par radiofréquence (RFID) est l’une des technologies qui a une
part importante dans l’IoT aujourd’hui. C’est une technologie embarquée, peu
onéreuse et qui ne nécessite aucune source d’alimentation supplémentaire dans
le cas de tag passif. Avec sa fonctionnalité omniprésente, cette technologie per-
met d’identifier un objet dans une zone spécifique. L’Assistance et l’Autonomie
des personnes à Domicile (AAL) est l’un des nombreux domaines qui bénéficient
de l’IoT. Il vise à aider les personnes âgées dans leurs routines quotidiennes en
fournissant de nouveaux services d’assistance dans les maisons intelligentes (smart
home). La présence de RFID dans une maison intelligente est d’une grande aide
pour une personne âgée et/ou déficiente, par exemple, pour l’aider à trouver un
objet dans son environnement quotidien.
Cependant, parmi tous les avantages qu’apporte l’IoT dans notre vie quotidienne
certains peuvent s’avérer de réels inconvénients en particulier la localisation et
le respect de la vie privée. En effet, pour pouvoir aider les personnes âgées à lo-
caliser un objet, le système nécessite certaines données relatives au positionnement
de cet objet, tout au moins son identification. Étant donné que la couverture de
l’étiquette RFID passive est très faible, une fois sa présence détectée, il est diffi-
cile de la masquer. La capacité de cette technologie à localiser des objets donne
l’occasion à une tierce personne de profiter du système.
Parallèlement au besoin persistant et constant de confidentialité par les utilisa-
teurs, l’objectif de cette thèse consiste à améliorer la confidentialité dans la local-
isation d’un objet grâce à un nouveau protocole basé sur la deuxième génération
de RFID passive. Le protocole proposé doit pouvoir empêcher un objet d’être
identifié et localisé par des parties non autorisées ou par un lecteur malveillant.
La première contribution de ce travail est l’évaluation de la gestion anti-collision
RFID. Elle est réalisée par la création d’un modèle OMNET++, construit sur la
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base de la dernière norme RFID développée par GS1 et adaptée par ISO / IEC
appelé Gen2V2 (RFID classe 2 Génération 2 Version 2). Les étiquettes (tag) RFID
passives conforment à Gen2V2 communiquent dans la bande de fréquence UHF
(900MHZ) avec des portées de plusieurs dizaines de mètres. La norme Gen2V2
propose une liste de suites cryptographiques qui peuvent être utilisées comme
méthodes pour authentifier une étiquette et un lecteur. Cette nouvelle génération
d’étiquettes est soutenue par une alliance de fabricants appelée RAIN (RAdio fre-
quency IdentifatioN) qui favorise l’adoption du Gen2V2. Nous évaluons dans cette
thèse les performances globales du protocole anti-collision et nous comparons en-
suite quatre de ces suites cryptographiques, à savoir PRESENT80, XOR, AES128
et cryptoGPS pour garantir l’authentification lecteur/tag. Parmi les performances
évaluées dans ce modèle, nous nous sommes intéressé au nombre de collisions et à
la durée requise pour interroger un groupe d’étiquettes. Nous avons intégré la fonc-
tionnalité de localisation dans le modèle en s’appuyant sur les messages échangés
avant l’authentification, ce qui peut conduire à une localisation malveillante d’un
objet. Pour augmenter la confidentialité de la localisation au sein des applica-
tions AAL, nous proposons donc une deuxième contribution qui est une nouvelle
méthode de localisation basée sur les échanges standard Gen2V2 en anonymisant
l’identité de l’étiquette.
Mots clés : Internet des Objects, AAL, RFID, Authentication, Localisation, Vie
Privée
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Abstract
Internet of things (IoT) is currently on our doorsteps. Numerous domains have
benefited from this technology. It ranges from a simple application such as iden-
tifying an object up to handling a more complex system. The Radio Frequency
IDentification (RFID) is one of the enabling technologies that drive the IoT to
its position today. It is small, cheap and does not require any additional power
sources. Along with its ubiquitous functionality, this technology enables the po-
sitioning of an object within a specific area. Ambient Assisted Living (AAL) is
one of the many domains that benefit from the IoT. It aims at assisting elderly
people in their daily routines by providing new assistive services in smart homes
for instance. RFIDs in a smart home come as a great help to an elderly person, for
example, to find an object that they misplaced. However, even with all its benefits
in simplifying our lives, it is unfortunately double-edged where the advantage that
it brings to an object could in turn go against itself. Indeed to be able to help the
older adults to locate an object, the system requires certain data in relation to the
positioning of the object and its identification. As the passive RFID tag coverage
is very small, once its presence is detected, it is difficult to hide it. The ability of
this technology in localizing objects gives an opportunity to a third person to take
an advantage of the system.
In parallel with the persistent and constant need of privacy and secrecy by the
users, the objective of this thesis consists of improving the privacy in localizing
an object through a new protocol based on the latest version of the RFID second
generation passive tag. The proposed protocol must be able to prevent an object
from being identified and located by unauthorized parties or a malicious reader.
The first contribution of this work is the assessment of the RFID anti collision
management. It is performed through the creation of an OMNET++ framework,
modelled and built based on the latest RFID standard developed by GS1 and in-
corporated by ISO/IEC called Gen2V2 (RFID class 2 Generation 2 Version 2). It
is a passive RFID tag that does not require any internal power sources to oper-
ate. It communicates using the UHF frequency. The Gen2V2 standard provides
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a list of cryptographical suites that can be used as a method to authenticate a
tag and a reader. This new generation of tags is supported by an alliance of
manufacturers called RAIN (RAdio frequency IdentificatioN) that promotes the
adoption of the Gen2V2. The anti collision management overall performance is
then compared with its theoretical value and four of its cryptographical suites
namely PRESENT80, XOR, AES128 and cryptoGPS. Among the performances
evaluated within the framework is the number of collisions and the duration re-
quired to interrogate a group of tags. Note that an addition of a localization
functionality within the framework reveals that exchanged messages through wire-
less channel prior to the authentication can lead to a malicious localization of an
object. To increase the localization privacy within AAL application, we propose
therefore a second contribution which is a new localization method that is based
on the current Gen2V2 standard exchanges by anonymizing the tag identity.
Keywords: Internet of Things, Ambient Assisted Living, Radio Frequency Iden-
tification (RFID), Authentication, Localization, Privacy
